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Race and the Fourth Amendment
Tracey Maclin 51 Vand. L. Rev. 333 (1998)
In Whren v. United States, the Supreme Court held that pretextual
traffic stops do not raise Fourth Amendment concerns. In this Article,
Professor Maclin contends that by requiring only probable cause of a traffic
offense to justify pretextual seizures, the Court mistakenly ignores racial
impact when marking the protective boundaries of the Fourth Amendment.
Professor Maclin argues that race matters when measuring the dynamics and
legitimacy of certain police-citizen encounters. Pretextual traffic stops
unreasonably use racial targeting, therefore, the Court should make racial
impact a factor in determining the constitutionality of the pretextual seizure.
Professor Maclin begins by examining objective, empirical evidence
that police officers seize minority motorists for arbitrary traffic stops.
Although Whren concluded that a police officer's subjective intentions are ir-
relevant, this evidence of racial targeting is more objective and reliable than
other evidence the Court has sanctioned in Fourth Amendment analysis. The
Article then turns to the Court's Fourth Amendment precedent, concluding
that prior cases recognize the relevance of race, and that disparate racial im-
pact is a proper consideration for Fourth Amendment analysis. Finally, the
Article criticizes Whren because it fails to consider the real world of law en-
forcement and to reconcile that reality with a meaningful right to be free from
unreasonable seizures. The Court ignores the fact that police discretion, police
perjury, and the mutual distrust between black motorists and the police are
issues intertwined with traffic enforcement. As a result, Whren assures that
minority motorists will continue to feel like second-class citizens on the na-
tion's roads.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In America, police targeting of black people for excessive and
disproportionate search and seizure is a practice older than the
Republic itself.1 Thus, it was not startling to learn that a special
* Professor of Law, Boston University. I thank Amanda Metts and Lisa Dickstein for
their research and editing assistance. I also want to thank members of the Boston University
School of Law faculty workshop and Karen Tosh for their suggestions and comments.
1. A recent dispatch from the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette is illustrative of the low-visibility,
high-tension police confrontations that often occur in black neighborhoods and with black men:
It was 72 degrees and sunny in Homestead, a town just south of Pittsburgh, whose
better days saw steel mills ablaze, and streets busy with people on their way to well-
paying jobs....
At 3:10 in the afternoon, the police and the young black men standing on Amity
are playing the usual cat-and-mouse game. Two officers in a cruiser drive slowly past
the men and stare, silently sending the word: don't hang too long. The men shrug the
police off, walking casually away, but only until the car is out of sight. Then they re-
group.
The game continues for the rest of the day and into the night. Police drive quietly
by three more times. On the fourth pass, they order the men to move on or "someone's
going to jail."
Finally, two of the men give it up and leave for home. On the way, police stop and
search them. An officer notices a marijuana cigarette on the sidewalk and asks where it
came from. The men say they don't know. The police let them go.
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squad of the North Carolina Highway Patrol that uses traffic stops to
interdict illegal narcotics charged black male drivers with traffic
offenses at nearly twice the rate of other troopers patrolling the same
roads.2 The commander of the drug team issued more than sixty per-
cent of his traffic citations to black men. When confronted with this
evidence, he could not explain why he disproportionately stopped
black men: "I can't say I'm surprised, and I can't say I'm not sur-
prised. It doesn't bother me either way, to be honest with you."3
The commander's conduct comes from an ancient pedigree. In
1693, court officials in Philadelphia responded to complaints about
the congregating and traveling of blacks without their masters by
authorizing the constables and citizens of the city to "take up" any
black person seen "gadding abroad" without a pass from his or her
master.4 Of course, the order to stop and detain any Negro found on
the street did not distinguish between free and enslaved blacks. 5
Three years later, colonial South Carolina initiated a series of
measures that subjected blacks to frequent and arbitrary searches
and seizures. One such measure required state slave patrols to
search the homes of slaves for concealed weapons on a weekly basis. 6
A half-hour later, officers stop three more of the original group on Amity Street
and pat them down.
No arrest is made. But the message has been sent.
Ann Belser, Suspect Black Men Are Subject To Closer Scrutiny From Patrolling Police, And The
Result Is Often More Fear, Antagonism Between Them, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 5,
1996, at A15. The searches described above are plainly unconstitutional. See Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968) ("The police officer is not entitled to seize and search every person
whom he sees on the street or of whom he makes inquiries."). Unless the men engaged in
furtive gestures indicating possession of a weapon or were members of a gang known to carry
weapons, points which the officers surely would have noted, there is no legal basis for the
searches. Stories like this involving black men and the police are not hard to find, but seldom
does one read of similar stories involving the police and white men.
2. See Joseph Neff & Pat Stith, Highway Drug Unit Focuses on Blacks, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, North Carolina), July 28, 1996, at Al. The fact that black drivers received
twice as many traffic citations as white drivers might not be objectionable if black drivers, as a
group, were worse drivers than white drivers. There is, however, no empirical evidence to
support this proposition. See infra note 108.
3. Id.
4. See A. LEON HIGG NBOTHAm, JR., IN THE MATI'ER OF COLOR 276 (1978).
5. See id. Judge Higginbotham explained:
Since the presentment required that all Negroes carry passes from their master, it is
probable that its authors did not consider the distinction between free and enslaved
blacks important. Technically, any person in Philadelphia could 'take up' any Negro
who was simply 'gadding abroad' without a ticket from his master. The black was to be
imprisoned overnight without food and given thirty-nine lashes, more physical
punishment than white servants generally received for a major theft.
Id. (footnote omitted).
6. See William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning 602-
1791, at 440 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School) (on file with
author).
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These searches became biweekly in 1712 and extended to contraband
as well as weapons. In 1722, South Carolina authorized its slave pa-
trols to forcibly enter any home where the concealed weapons of
blacks might be found,7 and to detain suspicious blacks they
encountered. By 1737, slave patrols had power to search taverns and
homes suspected of serving blacks or housing stolen goods.8 Three
years later, South Carolina authorized its justices of the peace to
conduct warrantless searches for weapons and stolen goods and to
seize any slave suspected of any crime "whatsoever."9
To inhibit seditious meetings, Virginia, in 1726, permitted its
slave patrols to arrest slaves on bare suspicion.10 By 1738, Virginia's
patrols conducted mandatory searches of the homes of all blacks. The
patrols also possessed power to arrest blacks whose presence excited
suspicion and to detain any slave found off his master's property
without a pass.", In Virginia, as in its sister colonies, judges did not
supervise the activities of state slave patrols. Throughout the
southern colonies, "no neutral and detached magistrate intervened
between a patrolman's suspicions and his power to arrest or search,
for that power was ex officio."12
By the mid-1700s, oppressive British search and seizure prac-
tices that affected white colonists became a potent political issue
throughout the colonies. 3 But resistance to high-handed British in-
trusions did not inspire colonial officials to check the search and
seizure powers of southern slave patrols. In the mid-1760s, Virginia,
South Carolina, and Georgia reaffirmed their laws on slave patrols
enacted earlier in the century.14 A black resident of Savannah re-
called that in 1767, the slave patrol of that city would "enter the
house of any black person who kept his lights on after 9 P.M. and fine,
flog, and extort food from him."15
While many white colonists experienced arbitrary and suspi-
cionless intrusions of their homes and businesses, these practices
7. See id. at 441-442.
8. See id. at 442.
9. See id. at 444.
10. See id. at 437.
11. See id.
12. Id. at 449 (emphasis added).
13. See generally NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937); M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF
ASSISTANCE CASE (1978); Cuddihy, supra note 6; O.M. Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause
of the Revolution, in THE ERA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 40 (Richard B. Morris ed., 1939).
14. See Cuddihy, supra note 6, at 1150.
15. Id. at 1152 (footnote omitted).
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paled in comparison to the indignities and invasions suffered by
blacks at the hands of colonial officials.'6 White colonists rightfully
protested that certain British search and seizure practices conferred
"a power that places the liberty of every man in the hands of every
petty officer,"17 but at the same time, colonial officials denied blacks
the privacy and personal security that white colonists claimed as a
birthright. Blacks, both slave and free, were targeted for searches
and seizures solely because of their race-a phenomenon never expe-
rienced by white colonists.
Today, police departments across the nation, like the special
narcotics unit of the North Carolina Highway Patrol, continue to
target blacks in a manner reminiscent of the slave patrols of colonial
America. Using minor, generally under-enforced, traffic violations as
a pretext, officers target and stop black and Hispanic8 motorists be-
cause they hope to discover illegal narcotics or other criminal evi-
dence. 9  Despite criticism of this practice,20 a unanimous Supreme
Court recently stated that pretextual stops of black motorists do not
implicate the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures. In Whren v. United States, the Court
acknowledged that race-based enforcement of traffic laws violates the
Constitution,2' but it explained that "the constitutional basis for
objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the
16. See id. at 433 ("The subjugation of servants and slaves in the colonial South included
the most intensely general searches in pre-Revolutionary America.").
17. SMrrH, supra note 13, at 342 (quoting James Otis, Jr.'s argument to the
Massachusetts Superior Court in the 1761 Writs of Assistance case).
18. In some places, Hispanic motorists have been the targets of unusual police attention.
See Jennifer McKim, Arrests of Hispanic Drivers Challenged, BOSTON GLOBE, May 29, 1995, at
Metro/Region 15; Louise Taylor, A Fine Line. The Issue: How Police Target Drug Suspects, THE
SUN HERALD (Biloxi), Dec. 3, 1989, at Al. This Article, however, will focus on the interaction
between police and black motorists.
19. The practice has prompted one Congressman to introduce a bill that would require the
collection of data about all routine traffic stops by police officers. See 143 CONG. REC. El0-01
(daily ed. Jan. 7, 1997) (Statement of Representative John Conyers, Jr., of Michigan on the
introduction of Traffic Stops Statistics Act of 1997) ("African-Americans across the country are
familiar with the offense of DWB, driving while black. There are virtually no African-American
males-including Congressmen, actors, athletes, and office workers-who have not been
stopped at one time or another for an alleged traffic violation, namely driving while black.").
Professor David Harris has written an excellent essay cataloguing the practice. See generally
David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and
Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997); see also Tracey Maclin, Can
a Traffic Offense Be D.W.B. (Driving While Black)?, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 9, 1997, at M2.
20. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 19, at 546 n.10, 561 n.89; Andrea Ford, United by Anger,
LA TIMEs, Nov. 6, 1996, at B1.
21. 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
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Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment."22 According to
the Court, the subjective intentions of the police, including police
22. Id. at 1774. Thus, Whren does hold out the possibility that a black defendant could
raise a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge to a race-based pretextual stop.
Before a black motorist can obtain access to or challenge an officer's past practices regarding
traffic stops under an equal protection challenge, the defense may have to overcome a heavy
evidentiary burden. In United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996), decided three weeks
before Whren, the Court held that the essential elements of a selective prosecution claim must
be shown before the prosecution is required to provide access to its files for discovery purposes.
Thus, the defense must show beth a discriminatory effect and purpose by governmental actors.
See id. at 1487. Under Armstrong, "[tlo establish a discriminatory effect in a race case, the
claimant must show that similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted."
Id. The Court reserved the question of whether a criminal defendant must satisfy the similarly
situated requirement in a case where the prosecutor admits a discriminatory purpose. See id. at
1488 n.3.
Of course, a black motorist might argue that the reasoning of Armstrong follows from the
Court's reluctance to examine executive branch decisions on whom to prosecute, see id. at 1486,
and is thus inapplicable where the enforcement policies of the police are challenged, because
police are not entitled to the same degree of deference accorded prosecutors. But lower court
decisions subsequent to Armstrong and Whren have not read Armstrong narrowly, and have
applied its strict evidentiary burden to claims of selective enforcement by the police. See United
States v. Bullock, 94 F.3d 896, 899 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 966 (1997) (applying
Armstrong to affirm district court's ruling refusing defendant's attempt to present evidence and
to cross-examine the arresting officer about his past practice of using traffic stops of young black
males as a pretext for drug searches because the defendant "failed to lay any foundation for an
equal protection challenge based on racially selective enforcement procedures"); United States v.
Bell, 86 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 372 (1996) (holding that a black
defendant raising discriminatory enforcement claim against the police must show "people of
another race violated the law and the law was not enforced against them" and while Bell
showed that only blacks were arrested for violating bicycle headlamp law during a certain
month, he "failed to show white bicyclists also violated the statute and police chose not to arrest
them"). More importantly, Armstrong itself noted that the "requirements for a selective
prosecution claim draw on 'ordinary equal protection standards,' "Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1487
(quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)), which presumably would also apply
to an equal protection claim brought by a black motorist. See Janet Koven Levit, Pretextual
Traffic Stops: United States v. Whren and the Death of Terry v. Ohio, 28 LOY. U. CM. L.J. 145,
181 (1996) ("The Equal Protection claim [in a pretextual traffic case] would be a selective
enforcement claim.").
Even if a defendant is able to overcome the obstacles to discovery erected by Armstrong, to
prevail on the merits of an equal protection claim, he will have to show that he was singled out
because of his race or ethnicity, and that similarly situated white motorists were not stopped.
In the typical case, this means that a black defendant must show a specific intent or purpose by
either the officer or his department to target blacks for traffic stops. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct.
at 1487 (stating that a selective prosecution claimant must demonstrate that the prosecution
policy "had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose'")
(quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976) (finding that disparate racial impact standing alone does not constitute equal protection
violation and the challenger must show a discriminatory intent or purpose). Unless an officer
were to testify that the motorist was stopped because he was black or Hispanic, the specific
intent standard will doom the typical pretextual traffic stop case involving a black motorist. In
the atypical case involving a defense able to conduct a systematic study of the enforcement
practices of a particular police department, there is a better chance of success if statistics
suggest that officers are targeting black motorists. But even where statistics show a strong
correlation between race and a particular outcome, the Court has still required the individual
criminal defendant to prove that the government officials in his case were motivated by a
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motives based on racial stereotypes or bias, are irrelevant to ordinary
Fourth Amendment analysis.23
The Court's conclusion that the Fourth Amendment has noth-
ing to say about pretextual stops of black motorists is not surprising.
The reasonableness analysis of recent Fourth Amendment cases em-
phasizes objective standards.24 The Court disfavors criteria and stan-
dards that require judges to ascertain the motivations and expecta-
tions of police officers and citizens enmeshed in confrontations that
rarely have neutral observers. Moreover, the Whren Court's unwill-
ingness to consider the impact that pretextual traffic stops have on
black and Hispanic motorists is consistent with the modern Court's
trend of ignoring evidence of racial impact as a factor in the reason-
ableness analysis mandated by the Fourth Amendment.25
For example, in two earlier decisions, the Court refused to
consider or discuss evidence of racial impact. In Florida v. Bostick,26
narcotic officers boarded an interstate bus, randomly and without
suspicion, approached seated passengers, requested to see their iden-
tification and tickets, and asked for permission to search their lug-
gage.2 7 Despite being informed that drug interdiction raids on inter-
discriminatory intent. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) ("[T]o prevail
under the Equal Protection Clause, McCleskey must prove that the decisionmaker in his case
acted with discriminatory purpose.").
Finally, even if a black defendant challenging a pretextual traffic stop is able to obtain
discovery and prevail on the merits of an equal protection claim, there is the question of rem-
edy. The Court has shown no sign that it interprets the Equal Protection Clause to embody an
exclusionary rule remedy, or that the Clause even requires the dismissal of criminal charges in
a case involving a race-based prosecution. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1484 n.2 (noting that
the Court has "never determined whether dismissal of the indictment, or some other sanction, is
the proper remedy if a court determines that a defendant has been the victim of prosecution on
the basis of his race"); cf. Levit, supra, at 181 ("A selective enforcement claim is not an attack on
the merits of a criminal charge. It is an affirmative defense or serves as the basis for a
collateral attack under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.")
For these reasons, successful equal protection challenges to pretextual traffic stops by
minority motorists will be rare. Thus, the Whren Court's apparent accord with the constitu-
tional challenge in that case, 116 S. Ct. at 1774 ("We of course agree with petitioners that the
Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race."),
seems hollow.
23. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774 ("Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary,
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.").
24. See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248,
250-51 (1991); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1990).
25. Cf. Developments in the Law: Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472,
1498 (1988) [hereinafter Race and the Criminal Process] (stating that the Court's current
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment "ignores the distinctive class of harms that racially
discriminatory police behavior inflicts. The resulting [F]ourth [Almendment case law, not
surprisingly, is remarkably silent on the racial dimension of encounters between citizen and
police").
26. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
27. See id. at 431.
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state buses have a disparate impact on minority citizens, 28 the Court,
without commenting on the racial impact of this confrontation, held
that a bus raid did not automatically trigger Fourth Amendment pro-
tection because this tactic was not a per se seizure under the amend-
ment.29
Likewise, in Tennessee v. Garner,30 the Court ignored evidence
of racial impact. Garner concerned the validity of police using deadly
force to prevent the escape of an unarmed, fleeing felon.3' As in
Bostick, the Garner Court had evidence before it indicating that
unrestricted deadly force had a disproportionate impact on blacks.32
But neither the majority nor dissenting opinions discussed the fact
that unregulated deadly force policies result in the police shooting, or
shooting at, a disproportionate number of blacks.33 The majority opin-
ion did not even acknowledge that Edward Garner, who was shot in
28. See Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amicus Curiae at 8 n.19,
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (No. 89-1717) (noting that "[ijnsofar as the facts of the
reported bus interdiction cases indicate, the defendants all appear to be [b]lack or Hispanic").
Even Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, an organization that prior to Bostick had filed
86 amicus briefs in the Court supporting law enforcement interests, argued that drug
interdiction raids on buses violated the Fourth Amendment and alluded to the discriminatory
impact that these confrontations had on minority citizens. See Brief for the Americans for
Effective Law Enforcement, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 8, Bostick (No. 89-1717) (noting that the
Court has not extended the rationale of prior cases authorizing suspicionless seizures to the
setting of passengers sitting on a bus and "moreover, any such extension would be
constitutionally invalid. Setting aside equal protection issues, it is difficult to imagine a
scenario of police activities, as in the present case, upon a planeload of business class air
passengers arriving at a busy air terminal after an interstate flight.").
29. While the majority in Bostick ignored the racial impact of bus raids, the relevance of
race in police bus sweeps did not escape the scrutiny of Justice Marshall. In his dissent, Justice
Marshall noted that race was a factor influencing some officers' decisions about which passen-
gers to approach during a bus raid. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 441 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("Thus, the basis of the decision to single out particular passengers during a suspicionless sweep
is less likely to be inarticulable than unspeakable.").
30. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
31. See id. at 3.
32. See Appellee's Brief at 23-26, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (Nos. 83-1035,
83-1070) (noting statistical data that reveal "significant disparities in the use of deadly force
based on the race of the shooting victim/suspect and that virtually all of this disparity occurs as
the result of the Memphis policy that allows officers to exercise their discretion to shoot fleeing
property crime suspects").
33. In Memphis, the data indicated that "black property crime suspects were more than
twice as likely to be shot at than whites... four times more likely to be wounded, and 40% more
likely to be killed." Appellee's Brief at 24, Garner (Nos. 83-1035, 83-1070); see also James J.
Fyfe, Blind Justice: Police Shootings In Memphis, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 707, 721
(1982) ('The data strongly support the assertion that police [in Memphis] did differentiate
racially with their trigger fingers, by shooting blacks in circumstances less threatening than
those in which they shot whites."). See generally POLICE FOUNDATION, READINGS ON POLICE USE
OF DEADLY FORCE 128-213 (James J. Fyfe ed., 1982).
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the back of the head by a Memphis officer as he fled the scene of a
burglary, was a skinny, unarmed black teenager.
Considering the Court's prior rulings, the decision in Whren to
ignore racial impact when marking the protective boundaries of the
Fourth Amendment was predictable. But predictability is not
equivalent to correctness. In Whren, the Court repeats its earlier
mistakes in Garner and Bostick by neglecting racial concerns when
constructing Fourth Amendment rules that govern police-citizen
interactions.
Although the casual reader of the Court's Fourth Amendment
opinions would never know it, race matters34 when measuring the
dynamics and legitimacy of certain police-citizen encounters. 5
Indeed, in light of past and present tensions between the police and
minority groups, it is startling that the Court would ignore racial
concerns when formulating constitutional rules that control police
discretion to search and seize persons on the street. The Court cur-
rently focuses solely on whether probable cause of a traffic offense
exists when judging the legality of pretextual seizures. Curiously,
this analysis, taken from the Fourth Amendment's mandate of
"reasonable" searches and seizures, fails to consider a factor that
often stands at the core of pretextual traffic stops and makes those
encounters particularly unreasonable-race. In this Article, I argue
that the Court should make racial concerns a part of its Fourth
Amendment analysis. In particular, where evidence indicates racial
34. The phrase "race matters" is borrowed from Cornel West's enlightening and
provocative book, Race Matters. See CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS (1993).
35. For a sample of some of the legal scholarship on this point, see Harris, supra note 19,
at 544 (1997); David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659 (1994) [hereinafter Harris, Reasonable Suspicion]; Sheri
Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision To Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L. REv. 214 (1983); Tracey
Maclin, 'Black and Blue Encounters"-Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment
Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243 (1991); Robin K. Magee, The Myth of the
Good Cop and the Inadequacy of Fourth Amendment Remedies for Black Men: Contrasting
Presumptions of Innocence and Guilt, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 151 (1994); David 0. Markus, Whren v.
United States: A Pretext to Subvert the Fourth Amendment, 14 HARV. BLACKLEMER J.
(forthcoming 1998); William R. O'Shields, The Exodus of Minorities' Fourth Amendment Rights
into Oblivion: Florida v. Bostick and the Merits of Adopting a Per Se Rule Against Random,
Suspicionless Bus Searches in the Minority Community, 77 IowA L. REv. 1875 (1992); Adina
Schwartz, 'Just Take Away Their Guns": The Hidden Racism of Terry v. Ohio, 23 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 317 (1996); Robert V. Ward, Consenting to a Search and Seizure in Poor and Minority
Neighborhoods: No Place for a "Reasonable Person", 36 How. L.J. 239 (1993); Randall S.
Susskind, Note, Race, Reasonable Articulable Suspicion, and Seizure, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 327
(1994).
Professor Randall Kennedy has written a powerful book on race and the criminal law. See
RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CaIMm AND LAw (1997). A chapter in his book is devoted to whether
it is proper to use race as a proxy for criminal suspicion. Professor Kennedy strongly opposes
governmental use of race in this context. See id. at 162.
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targeting by the police, the state should be required to provide a race-
neutral explanation for the seizure other than probable cause of a
traffic violation.s6
Part II of this Article offers objective evidence that police offi-
cers seize black and Hispanic motorists for arbitrary traffic stops.
Much of this evidence consists of empirical data indicating that black
motorists are stopped for traffic offenses at a rate highly dispropor-
tionate to the percentage of black motorists eligible for lawful traffic
detentions. Whren concluded that the subjective intentions of the
police are irrelevant in Fourth Amendment cases, but the evidence of
racial targeting discussed here does not measure the subjective
motivations of officers. Rather, this evidence describes the racial
population of motorists actually stopped by officers. Ironically, this
evidence is more objective and reliable than other evidence the Court
has sanctioned in determining the reasonableness of investigative
detentions.
Part III argues that the Rehnquist Court's disjunction of race
and the Fourth Amendment is wrong as a matter of precedent. Prior
cases recognize the relevance of race. Indeed, these cases acknowl-
edge two things: (1) disparate racial impact of police search and
seizure methods is a proper consideration for Fourth Amendment
analysis; and (2) where government officials submit that racial factors
promote law enforcement interests, the court has allowed the police to
36. Pretextual seizures are emphasized for two reasons. First, pretextual seizures are
quintessential Fourth Amendment claims. When an officer uses a traffic violation as a pretext
to stop a motorist for other investigatory purposes, the motorist's right to enjoy the freedom of
movement protected by the amendment is impaired. Second, empirical evidence, case law, and
anecdotal evidence shows that race matters in the effectuation of many pretextual seizures.
Although space constraints prevent discussion of the matter here, race may also be a factor
in excessive force cases-another type of Fourth Amendment seizure-but the Court's constitu-
tional analysis in this context omits discussion of race. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
397 (1989) (holding that the reasonableness inquiry in an excessive force claim is an objective
test: Were the officer's actions reasonable in light of the facts, without regard to their
underlying intent or motivation?). For a recent discussion on race and excessive force by the
police, see William A. Geller & Hans Toch, Understanding and Controlling Police Abuse of
Force, in POLICE VIOLENCE 292, 305-09 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996); Hubert G.
Locke, The Color of Law and the Issue of Color: Race and the Abuse of Police Power, in POLICE
VIOLENCE 129-49 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996). For more focused discussion of
the issue of race and police brutality, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
POLICE BRUTALITY AND EXCESSIVE FORCE IN THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 1 (1996)
('[Tihe evidence suggests that the large majority of the victims of police abuses are racial
minorities, particularly African-Americans and people of Latin American or Asian descent.
Racial disparities appear to be especially marked in cases involving deaths in custody or
questionable shootings."); Steven Stycos, The Force of Law, THE PROVIDENCE PHOENIX, May 27,
1994, at 4 (detailing police brutality against minority persons in Providence, Rhode Island).
1998] 341
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utilize racial and ethnic factors when deciding who will be seized and
searched in certain investigatory contexts.
Part IV contends that when police target a black or Hispanic
motorist for a pretextual traffic stop, this stop violates the Fourth
Amendment. Currently, the Amendment protects a black motorist
only when there is no probable cause that he has committed a traffic
offense; if probable cause exists, police are free to conduct a traffic
stop at their whim. The procedural right established under this re-
gime does not stop arbitrary seizures because it fails to consider that
police discretion, police perjury, and the mutual distrust between
blacks and the police are issues intertwined with the enforcement of
traffic stops.
II. PRETEXTUAL SEIZURES
In Whren, the two black defendants argued that plain clothes
vice-squad officers of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police
Department conducted a pretextual stop of their car in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. That is, the officers used the existence of a traf-
fic violation as an excuse to stop the defendants' car when the officers
lacked evidence of other criminal conduct.37 The officers did not in-
tend to enforce the District's traffic code,38 but suspected the defen-
dants of narcotics violations. As happens so often, the officers ob-
served, in plain view, drugs in the lap of one of the defendants before
the investigation could unfold.39
37. See Petitioner's Brief at 1-8, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No. 95-
5841). At the time of the stop, D.C. Metropolitan Police Regulations barred plain-clothes offi-
cers in unmarked police cars from making traffic stops except where a traffic violation was so
grave as to create an immediate threat to the safety of persons. See i& at 1-2.
38. See id. at 7. One of the arresting officers in Whren, Officer Soto, testified: "The only
circumstances that I would issue tickets-I'm a vice investigator; I'm not out there to give
tickets-is for just reckless, reckless driving." He also stated that as a vice officer, he is "out
there almost strictly to do drug investigations," and that he rarely stops motorists for traffic
offenses. Id. (emphasis added).
39. After reviewing so many cases where police officers testify that they discovered illegal
drugs in plain view or after a consent search, judges may begin to wonder why drug dealers are
so stupid. See Official Transcript Proceedings Before The Supreme Court of United States at
16-17, Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (No. 89-1717) ("QUESTION [from Justice Marshall]:
And it is always interesting to me that all of the drug pushers, when you ask to search them,
they say, oh, come on."... "Ms. Fowler [for State of Florida): I think a reasonable person would
do it... [blecause they are trying to be cooperative.").
Of course, there is an alternative explanation other than drug dealers' desire to cooperate
with the police for the type of police testimony seen in Whren and other cases where drugs are
claimed to be found in plain view or after a consent search: police perjury. As Joseph D.
McNamara, the former Police Chief of Kansas City and San Jose, has explained:
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In addition to their argument that the Court's precedents dis-
favored pretextual seizures as a general matter,40 the defendants also
pointed to evidence that officers often target black and Hispanic mo-
torists for pretextual traffic stops to launch unwarranted criminal
investigations. 41 According to the defendants, this evidence indicated
that police discretion and bias, rather than a bona fide interest in
enforcing the traffic code, motivated the traffic stops.42 Without ques-
tioning the validity of the defendants' evidence, the Court rejected the
argument and dismissed the notion that the Fourth Amendment is
concerned about the racial motives of police officers when making
traffic stops. The Court concluded that if there is objective probable
cause of a traffic violation, a stop is always reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment regardless of the subjective reasons that may
have actually motivated the challenged stop.43
[HI]undreds of thousands of police officers swear under oath that the drugs were in plain
view or that the defendant gave consent to a search. This may happen occasionally but
it defies belief that so many drug users are careless enough to leave illegal drugs where
the police can see them or so dumb as to give cops consent to search them when they
possess drugs.
Joseph D. McNamara, Has the Drug War Created an Officer Liars' Club?, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11,
1996, at Ml; see also Donald A. Dripps, Police, Plus Perjury, Equals Polygraphy, 86 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIwNOLOGY 693, 695-96 (1996):
On its face, the police account is highly improbable. Why would a cocaine smuggler
consent to a search that could send him to prison for decades? We can suppose that
criminals are not rocket scientists and that Freud's insights apply to criminals no less
than to anyone else. But even ifa self-destructive error of the sort posited by the police
is possible, it is not probable.
Id. For more on the connection between police perjury and pretextual traffic stops, see Part
IV.B.
40. See Petitioners' Brief at 31-37, Whren (No. 95-5841).
41. See id. at 21-28.
42. See id.
43. The Court reasoned that precedent and Fourth Amendment theory "foreclose any
argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motiva-
tions of the individual officers involved." Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996).
The Court's response to the petitioners' argument about racial impact was so terse one gets the
impression "that the Justices may not have taken the argument seriously." Harris, supra note
19, at 550. While the Whren Coures analysis of race and the Fourth Amendment is wrong, see
discussion infra Part HI, other aspects of Whren have also been the subject of severe criticism.
See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE OF THE FoURTH AMENDMENT
§ 1.4, at 13. (3d ed. Supp. 1997). Professor Lafave stated:
The Coures analysis in Whren is, to put it mildly, quite disappointing. By misstating its
own precedents and mischaracterizing the petitioners' central claim, the Court managed
to trivialize what in fact is an exceedingly important issue regarding a pervasive law
enforcement practice. Certainly one would have expected more from an opinion which
drew neither a dissent nor a cautionary concurrence from any member of the Court.
Id. See also Morgan Cloud, Judges, "Testilying," and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341,
1366 (1996) (noting that a flaw in an "objective" test for pretext claims is that the Fourth
Amendment exists "to regulate the actual conduct of actual government agents in actual cases.
The task of a judge reviewing government searches and seizures in a specific case is to analyze
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The reasoning of Whren begs the obvious question of why the
Court considers police reliance on race when making a traffic stop
reasonable conduct under the Fourth Amendment. Although the
Court reaffirmed its unwillingness to consider subjective motives in
Fourth Amendment analysis," it mistakenly suggests that the evi-
dence of racial impact connected with pretextual traffic stops falls
into a category of "subjective" evidence. On the contrary, evidence of
racial decisionmaking by officers often rests on solid empirical data
and indicates much more than the subjective bias of a few rogue offi-
cers. Not only does evidence of racial impact linked to pretextual
traffic stops indicate arbitrary and discriminatory seizures, but much
of the evidence produced to date is far more objective than other types
of evidence the Court has sanctioned when upholding police deten-
tions of persons and effects. 45
A. Objective Evidence of Racial Targeting
Those familiar with law enforcement methods know that police
target black and Hispanic motorists for pretextual traffic stops. 46 The
police in Avon, Connecticut, a predominately white suburb near the
City of Hartford, for example, have been conducting pretextual stops
for years. They even have a name for the practice: the "Barkhamsted
Express." They use the expression "to refer to carloads of black and
Puerto Rican people traveling through town in the summer from
Hartford to the Barkhamsted reservoir."47 The town's attorney wrote
both the conduct of the officers and the motives that generated that conduct"). See generally
Levit, supra note 22 (concluding that the result in Whren subverts the protections established
by the Court's investigative detention cases, and leaves motorists subject to arbitrary police
seizures); Sean Hecker, Note, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role For
Civilian Review Boards, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 551 (1997) (criticizing Whren for failing
to address the point that arbitrary police seizures abuse the community's confidence in police,
which in turn, undermines the rule of law).
44. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774 ("Not only have we never held, outside the context of
inventory search or administrative inspection ... that an officer's motive invalidates objectively
justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment, but we have repeatedly held and asserted
the contrary.").
45. See infra notes 113-120 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., MICHAEL K. BROWN, WORKING THE STREET: POLICE DISCRETION AND THE
DILEMMAS OF REFORM 170 (1988). The Author relates this story:
A patrolman ran a warrant check on a car with a broken rear taillight and four young
blacks in it. He found the car had a warrant, and stopped the car and checked the
driver for warrants. The driver was not wanted, and the patrolman did not cite him for
the rear taillight because, as he put it, the man had the "right attitude." Later the
patrolman said he investigated the car in the first place because there were blacks in it,
and with blacks "there is always a greater chance of something wrong.
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in a report that the supervising sergeant of the Avon Police
Department instructed his officers to find a reason to stop black and
Hispanic motorists driving through Avon.48 The sergeant thought it
proper to scrutinize and run license plate checks on motorists who "do
not appear to have business in Avon."49 He also believed that "the
presence of a large number of blacks or Hispanics in a vehicle would
fall within the category of people 'not appearing to have business in
Avon.' "50
After public disclosure of the sergeant's instructions, other
officers and former officers in the department admitted that "top Avon
police officials have long tolerated a practice of targeting blacks and
I-Ispanics" who drive through Avon.5l It was alleged that nearly one-
third of the department's officers targeted minority drivers, although
no formal policy ordered the practice.52 A subsequent internal police
investigation also showed that the department accepted the practice
of pretextual traffic stops of minority drivers.8 This later report
stated that higher-ranking officers told patrol officers to stop vehicles
containing minorities to "'see what they are up to out here.' "5
The practice of targeting black and Hispanic motorists is not
confined to police departments that patrol white suburbs surrounding
America's urban centers. Police also employ the tactic on the nation's
47. Kathleen Gorman, Avon Police Target Black, Hispanic Drivers, Report Says, THE
HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 13, 1994, at Al.
48. See id. Not surprisingly, Sgt. Thomas Transue, in defending the practice, noted that
no minority motorist was stopped without probable cause of a traffic violation. See id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Kathleen Gorman, Racial Checks Routine, Ex Avon Officer Says, THE HARTFORD
COURANT, Apr. 17, 1994, at Al.
52. See id. (Four former and current police officers said that "the practice of targeting
blacks and Hispanics is not condoned by a majority of the members of the police department.
But they say as many as 10 of the department's 30 members are known to follow the practice.").
53. See Brian M. Trotta, Report: Avon Police Targeted Minorities; Internal Probe Supports
Ex-Officer's Discrimination Claims, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 22, 1994, at Al.
54. Id. The internal report, written by three sergeants in the Avon Police Department
noted:
Sgt. Transue would not come out and say to stop them [Hispanics] for no reason, but it
was implied, such as, "Today is Sunday, you can all bring up your motor vehicle activity.
The [Barkhamsted] is coming through," or "Why don't you go out and jump on the
Express today."
The sergeanfs report also noted that a second officer, when asked whether he had been
instructed to target minority drivers, replied:
Yes, by both Sgt. Transue and by [acting Sergeant Stanley] Barnett.... There would be
times on the midnight shift when Sgt. Transue was parked next to me and a car with
blacks or Hispanics would drive by and he would say "Go stop that car, see what they
are doing out here. They don't belong out here, see where they are coming from."
Barnett would do the same thing or describe a car on the air, infer that it contained
minorities and direct me to "Stop it and see what they are up to out here."
1998] 345
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
interstate highways.55 Two recent court cases, from New Jersey and
Maryland,56 indicate that state troopers target black motorists for
pretextual traffic stops on America's busiest highway, Interstate 95.
In the late 1980s, New Jersey criminal defense lawyers and
civil rights advocates often complained that state troopers targeted
black motorists on the New Jersey Turnpike for pretextual traffic
stops to launch unwarranted narcotics investigations. State officials
denied the charges and critics of the state police could not produce a
"smoking gun" to substantiate their charges. 7 But in 1990, the newly
appointed State Police Superintendent made an astonishing state-
ment: He conceded that "'a very small number" of troopers engaged
in racially discriminatory stops.58 Then, in April 1993, a Superior
Court judge found that twenty troopers may have arrested motorists
based on racial considerations. 9 A few months later, after urging the
dismissal of 618 narcotics cases, the Middlesex County Prosecutor
stated: "Twenty particular state troopers may have enforced the law
in a racial[ly] selective way on their own initiative."60
Complaints of race-based traffic enforcement continued, but no
empirical evidence supported the allegations until New Jersey v.
Id.
55. See Dateline NBC: Probable Cause?; Policemen In Louisiana Harass Motorists And
Seize Their Property For No Apparent Reason (NBC television broadcast, Jan. 3, 1997)
[hereinafter Dateline]; Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, Color Of Driver Is Key To Stops In 1-95 Videos;
The Tapes Show That Most Stops And Searches By Volusia County's Drug Squad Involve
Minorities, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 23, 1992, at Al. The videotapes show that:
Almost 70 percent of the motorists stopped were black or Hispanic, an enormously
disproportionate figure because the vast majority of interstate drivers are
white.... More than 80 percent of the cars that were searched were driven by blacks
and Hispanics.... Although deputies contend they stop cars only for legitimate traffic
violations... only nine of 1,084 drivers stopped-less than one percent-received traffic
tickets.
Id.
56. See Letter from Judge Robert E. Francis to Counsel, RE: State v. Pedro Soto (Mar. 4,
1996) (on file with author); Harris, supra note 19, at 564 (discussing Wilkins v. Maryland State
Police, unreported).
57. See Bill Sanderson, Reining in State Troopers; Drug Searches to be Curtailed, RECORD
(Northern New Jersey), Feb. 23, 1990, at Al.
58. See Robert Schwaneberg & Dan Weissman, Troopers Warned on Driver Rights;
Dintino Issues Strict New Guidelines Following Cases of Abuse on Pike, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
New Jersey), Feb. 23, 1990, available in 1990 WL 3507300. Superintendent Justin Dintino's
admission that even "'a very small number of troopers [may] have abused their power and the
public'" by targeting black motorists for traffic stops is astonishing because traditionally police
officers and their advocates, particularly high-ranking officials, are reluctant to publicly admit
police misconduct.
59. See Thomas Zambito, Judge Dismisses Turnpike Arrests; Public Defender Said
Troopers Demonstrated Pattern Of Bias, RECORD (Northern New Jersey), Aug. 8, 1993, at A3;
Charges Are Dropped Against 618 Drivers In Some Of The New Jersey Turnpike Cases, Racial
Discrimination Had Been Alleged In The Stops, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Aug. 9, 1993, at S4.
60. Mike Kelly, Race On The Road, RECORD (Northern New Jersey), Aug. 10, 1993, at Cl.
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Pedro Soto.61 In Pedro Soto, decided three months before Whren, the
black defendants were stopped by troopers on the southern portion of
the Turnpike. The trial court judge ruled that the defendants proved
that state troopers seized black motorists for traffic stops because of
their race.62  The trial judge found that the defendants had
established a prima facie case of selective enforcement which the
State failed to rebut. The trial judge required the suppression of all
contraband and evidence seized by troopers patrolling the exits in
question for a three-year period.63
The trial judge based his conclusion on a voluminous record.
The prosecution and defense agreed upon a database of 3,060 traffic
stops, which were broken down according to the race of the occupants
of the vehicles.6 Relying on testimony and statistical surveys pro-
vided by experts for the defense, the trial judge noted the following
statistical data for traffic patterns on the Turnpike between exits 1
and 7A: A count of the traffic indicated that 13.5% of the automobiles
carried a black occupant. A count of the traffic surveyed for speeding
indicated that 98.1% of the vehicles on the road exceeded the speed
limit. Fifteen percent of the speeding vehicles had a black occupant.
Fifteen percent of the automobiles that both violated the speed limit
and committed some other moving violation also had a black occu-
pant.
Comparing these percentages with the data on racially identi-
fied stops, the trial judge found that while automobiles with black
occupants represented only 15% of the motorists who violated the
speeding laws, 46.2% of the race identified stops between exits 1 and
3 were of black motorists.65 Using the data for the entire portion of
the Turnpike patrolled by the troopers of the Moorestown Station,66
the trial judge concluded that 35.6% of the race identified stops be-
61. Letter from Judge Francis, supra note 56, at 1.
62. Superior Court Judge Robert E. Francis's opinion in Pedro Soto was first made
available in the form of a letter-opinion to the counsel involved in the case. See id.
63. See id. at 1.
64. See id. Of the 3,060 traffic stops in the agreed upon database, the state claimed that
1,212 (39.6%) stops involved racial minorities, while the defense claimed that 1,146 (37.4%)
stops involved racial minorities. See id.
65. See id. at 2-3. Statistically speaking, Judge Francis explained that the 46.2% figure of
blacks stopped constituted "an absolute disparity of 32.7%, a comparative disparity of 242%
(32.7% divided by 13.5%) and 16.35 standard deviations." Id. at 3. According to Judge Francis,
"something is considered statistically significant if it would occur by chance fewer than five
times in a hundred (over two standard deviations)." Id.




tween exits 1 and 7A involved vehicles with black occupants.6 7 The
trial judge did not dispute the defense expert's opinion that "it is
highly unlikely such statistics could have occurred randomly or by
chance."68
The trial judge also took note of another defense survey de-
signed to measure the discretion of troopers when issuing traffic
tickets. The database for this survey contained 533 racially identified
tickets issued by three different trooper units. 69 The "Radar Unit"
concentrated on speeding vehicles "using a radar van and chase cars
and exercised limited discretion regarding which vehicles to stop."7°
The "Tactical Patrol Unit" focused on "traffic problems at specific
locations and exercise[d] somewhat more discretion as regards which
vehicles to stop."71 Troopers of the "Patrol Unit" were responsible for
providing general law enforcement and exercised "by far the most
discretion among the three units."72
The statistical study of race identified traffic tickets indicated
the following:
18% of the tickets issued by the Radar Unit were to blacks, 23.8% of the tickets
issued by the [Tactical Unit] were to blacks while 34.2% of the tickets issued
by the Patrol Unit were to blacks. South of exit 3, [the defense expert]
computed that 19.4% of the tickets issued by the Radar Unit were to blacks,
0.0% of the tickets issued by the [Tactical Unit] were to blacks while 43.8% of
the tickets issued by the Patrol Unit were to blacks.73
Based on all of this statistical evidence, the trial judge con-
cluded that the defendants established a "de facto policy" by
Moorestown Station troopers of "targeting blacks for investigation and
arrest between April 1988 and May 1991 both south of exit 3 and be-
67. See id. According to Judge Francis, the "35.6% of the race identified stops between
exits 1 and 7A... constitut[ed] an absolute disparity of 22.1%, a comparative disparity of 164%
and 22.1 standard deviations." Id. Judge Francis wrote that the defense's statistical expert
should have used the 15% figure from the "violator survey" instead of the 13.5% figure from the
"traffic survey" as the benchmark when making statistical comparisons with race identified stop
data in the agreed-upon database. Despite this error, Judge Francis found that "whatever the
correctly calculated disparities and standard deviations ... they would be nearly equal to those
calculated by [Dr. John Lamberth, the defense expert]." Id. at 3, n.3. Dr. Lamberth, Chairman
of the Psychology Department at Temple University, designed the defense "traffic" and
"violator" surveys. Judge Francis found that Dr. Lamberth was qualified as an expert in
statistics and social psychology.
68. Id. at 3 (footnote omitted).
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tween exits 1 and 7A of the Turnpike."74 According to the trial judge
the "statistical disparities and standard deviations revealed are in-
deed stark."75
In the second case demonstrating racial targeting of black
motorists for pretextual traffic stops on Interstate 95, Wilkins v.
Maryland State Police, a state trooper stopped an automobile with
four black occupants for speeding in April 1992 in Allegheny County.76
One of the occupants was Robert Wilkins, a Washington, D.C.,
criminal defense lawyer, who with his family, was returning to
Washington after attending a funeral in Chicago.
The officer requested permission for a consent search, but
Wilkins told the trooper that he was an attorney who had a court
appearance later in the morning, and that the officer had no right to
search the car without arresting the driver. After the request to
search was denied, the officer ordered the occupants out of the car
and detained them while a drug-sniffing dog was brought to the scene.
The canine sniff revealed no narcotics. The officer then permitted
Wilkins and his family to leave after more than a half-hour detention.
The driver was given a $105 speeding ticket.
Wilkins subsequently filed a class action lawsuit alleging
Maryland troopers were illegally stopping black motorists because of
their race. During the initial stages of the litigation, a state police
intelligence report was discovered which warned troopers in
Allegheny County to be alert for "dealers and couriers (traffickers)
[who] are predominately black males and black females... utilizing
Interstate 68." 7 As part of the final settlement, the Maryland State
Police were required to provide the federal district court and
plaintiffs' counsel with data on state police searches of motorists
conducted from January 1995 through September 1996.78
In addition to the police data, the plaintiffs' expert designed a
statistical plan to determine whether Maryland troopers stop and
search black motorists at a rate disproportionate to their numbers on
the roads. Part of this plan included a "rolling survey" which
determined, inter alia, the racial composition of motorists on
Interstate 95 in the counties north of Baltimore, and the racial
74. Id at 16.
75. Id.
76. See Harris, supra note 19, at 564.
77. See id. at 565 (quoting MARYLAND STATE POLICE, CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
(Apr. 27, 1992)).
78. Id at 565-66.
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composition of those motorists on Interstate 95 in the counties north
of Baltimore who were violating traffic laws79
The rolling survey indicated that 93.3% of the drivers on
Interstate 95 "were violating traffic laws and thus were eligible to be
stopped by State Police. Of the violators, 17.5% were black, and
74.7% were white."80 Data from the Maryland State Police measured
the number of motorists stopped and searched by troopers on
Interstate 95, north of Baltimore between January 1995 and
September 1996. The police data indicated the following: 72.9% of
the motorists stopped and searched were black; 80.3% of the motorists
searched were black, Hispanic or some other racial minority group;
19.7% of those searched were white.8'
The police data also measured the number of searches
conducted by individual troopers on Interstate 95 north of Baltimore.
This data indicated that thirteen troopers conducted 85.4% of the
searches. With the exception of one trooper, all of these troopers
searched black and other minority motorists at much higher rates
than these motorists travel on the highway. The trooper (omitting the
trooper who searched black motorists at a rate close to their presence
on the roads) with the lowest percentage of black motorist searches
still searched black motorists at nearly twice the rate they were found
to travel on the highway. The trooper with the highest percentage of
black motorist searches searched only black motorists. Ten of the
thirteen troopers searched minority motorists at least 80% of the
time.8 2
The police data also included information on motorists
searched by the police who traveled on roads outside of the northern
portion of Interstate 95. This data contrasted significantly with the
searches conducted on Interstate 95. For example, wvhile troopers
searched white motorists 19.7% of the time on Interstate 95, troopers
patrolling outside of Interstate 95 searched white motorists 63.7% of
the time. Troopers searched 72.9% of the black motorists on
Interstate 95, but only 32% on other state roads.83 According to the
79. *See Report of John Lamberth, 1 (on file with author).
80. Id. at 2.
81. The federal district judge did not order the Maryland State Police to keep track of all
stops conducted by troopers. Instead, only stops that included consent or canine searches were
required to be recorded. Thus, the state-supplied data "might tend to underestimate the total
number of racially biased stops on the highways, because they only include stops that are
followed by searches, and only two kinds of searches at that: searches by consent and searches
with dogs." Harris, supra note 19, at 566 n.130.
82. See Report of John Lamberth, supra note 79, at 4.
83. See id. at 3-4.
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plaintiffs' expert, black motorists "traveling 1-95 are searched by state
police more than twice as often as are black motorists traveling other
Maryland roadways."84
Finally, the police data included information on the number of
searches that revealed contraband. Troopers found contraband in
28.1% of the cars they searched. The success rate of troopers on
Interstate 95 was approximately the same as for searches on other
state roads: Troopers found contraband in 29.9% of the cars on
Interstate 95 and in 27.1% of the cars on roads outside of Interstate
95.8 According to the plaintiffs' expert, the police data reported no
statewide differences in the success rate of troopers when searching
black and white motorists: Troopers recovered contraband from
28.4% of the black motorists searched and from 28.8% of the white
motorists searched. Thus, seventy percent of the searches uncovered
no contraband86 Finally, of all the searches conducted on Interstate
95, troopers arrested the driver in 29.9% of the searches.
According to the plaintiffs' expert, the sum of this information
"reveals dramatic and highly statistically significant disparities be-
tween the percentage of black Interstate 95 motorists legitimately
subject to stop by Maryland State Police and the percentage of black
motorists detained and searched by [Maryland State Police] troopers
on this roadway."87 Particularly noteworthy is the difference between
the percentage of blacks subject to lawful stops (17.5%) and the
percentage of blacks actually stopped and searched (72.9%).8 The
percentage of blacks stopped and searched on Interstate 95 (72.9%)
also contrasts significantly with the percentage of blacks stopped and
searched on other state roads (32%). 89 Put in simpler terms, "the
probability that black Interstate 95 drivers are subjected to searches
84. Id. at 4.
85. See id. at 4-5.
86. Seeid. at5.
87. Id.
88. According to the plaintiffs' expert, this percentage differential represents 34.6
standard deviations, the absolute disparity is 55.4% and the comparative disparity is 316%. The
plaintiffs' expert also noted that:
An ideal comparison would be the percentage of black traffic law violators to the
percentage of blacks stopped by the Maryland State Police. Stop data has not been
made available by Maryland State Police however. In the absence of that data, the
percentage of blacks searched provides a rough approximation of the percentage of
blacks stopped, given the fact that in 70% of the cases the search turned up no
contraband.
Id. at 6 n.8.
89. According to the plaintiffs' expert, the "absolute disparity in these figures is 40.9%,




at so high a rate by chance is less than one in one quintillion. It is
wildly significant by statistical measures."90
The statistics from Pedro Soto and Wilkins demonstrate that
some state troopers in New Jersey and Maryland are seizing black
motorists for traffic violations at a rate highly disproportionate to the
percentage of black motorists eligible for lawful stops. The evidence
in these cases is distinctive only because the statistics were generated
in actual court cases. The phenomenon that produced the data is
hardly unique, nor has it dissipated. In a report published a year
after Whren was decided, the Orlando Sentinel newspaper found that
the Criminal Patrol Unit of the Orange County Sheriffs Office is six-
and-a-half times more likely to search black motorists on the Florida
Turnpike than white motorists.91
The Criminal Patrol Unit is a special patrol squad that uses
routine traffic stops to search for narcotics. Reviewing records of
more than 3,800 stops by the Unit, the Sentinel report noted that
black drivers represented 16.3% of the drivers stopped, but consti-
tuted more than 50% of the searches and more than 70% of the canine
searches.92 The Sentinel report also found that troopers search black
motorists after traffic detentions at a rate substantially higher than
white motorists. For example, a traffic count of more than 10,000
vehicles in April and May 1997 found that blacks constituted less
than 5% of the motorists on the Florida Turnpike. But receipts from
traffic tickets and warning notices for stops from January 1996
through April 1997 reveal that "39.6% of black motorists were
90. Id. A lawyer for the Maryland State Police disputed the relevance of the traffic stop
statistics gathered by the plaintiffs' expert. See Kris Antonelli, State Police Deny Bias,
BALTIMORE SuN, Jan. 11, 1997, at lB. According to counsel for the State Police, the proper
point of comparison for the statistical data supplied by the State Police is not the percentage of
black motorists stopped for traffic violations, but the percentage of black motorists displaying
traits justifying an investigatory detention. Id. The problem with the state's response, of
course, is the absence of proof that Maryland State Troopers were detaining black motorists for
valid Terry stops. See also Hecker, supra note 43, at 563 ("[T]here is no evidence that
[Maryland] police justified a majority or even substantial minority of the stops by anything
other than a pretextual traffic violation. Moreover, if an officer had Terry-level suspicion, she
would not need to use a traffic violation as an excuse to investigate criminal conduct."). While
denying that Maryland had an official policy of stopping black motorists, counsel for the State
Police seemed to concede, however, that the state supplied data indicated that individual
troopers were targeting black motorists. See Antonelli, supra, at lB (noting counsel's statement
that statistics, at most, show discriminatory targeting by 14 individual troopers, but such action
by specific troopers cannot be used to prove a policy that the entire state police target black
motorists).
91. See Roger Roy & Henry Pierson Curtis, When Cops Stop Blacks, Drug Search Often
Follows: Orange County Deputies Deny Race Plays a Role in Stops on the Turnpike, But Some




RACE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
searched, compared with 6.2% of white motorists. Motorists listed as
Asian, Hispanic or other ethnicities were searched 17.9% of the
time."93 Eighty percent of all the searches uncovered no contraband. 94
The data on the searches conducted by the supervising ser-
geant of the Criminal Patrol Unit is particularly revealing. The ser-
geant "led by example, stopping as many cars as possible [for traffic
violations] to increase the odds of finding drugs."95 He searched only
2% of the white drivers he stopped, but searched 35.5% of the black
drivers he stopped. Asked about the disparity, the sergeant stated: "I
run through the same thing every time, whether they're black, white
or Hispanic. I just don't know."6 While the sergeant and other offi-
cers denied that race influences their decisions to search motorists,
the sergeant could not explain why black motorists were six-and-a-
half times more likely to be searched than white motorists.
Faced with similar evidence of racial targeting, the supervising
sergeant of a special drug patrol squad in western North Carolina
expressed indifference to the fact that his drug squad stopped black
motorists for traffic violations more frequently than other troopers
patrolling the same roads, and that his squad searched black motor-
ists at a higher rate than white motorists after routine traffic stops. 97
The News & Observer newspaper of Raleigh, North Carolina, con-
ducted a study of 1995 patrol records of the Special Emphasis Team of
the North Carolina Highway Patrol, whose goal was to interdict nar-
cotics through traffic stops on Interstates 85 and 95. The study found
that the Team "charged black male drivers [with traffic offenses] at
nearly twice the rate of other troopers working the same roads."98
According to the News & Observer report, black male drivers
received almost 45% of the traffic citations issued by the Special
93. Id. According to Roger Roy, one of the authors of the Sentinel report, the Orange
County Sheriffs Office does not keep records on the race of motorists who are subjected to
canine or consent searches by the Criminal Patrol Unit during traffic stops. However, extensive
statistics about stops, seizures and arrests are maintained. The Sentinel report was able to
determine the race of motorists who were searched by examining the receipts that drug squad
deputies kept after issuing traffic tickets or warning notices to motorists. After every traffic
stop, deputies were required to issue either a traffic ticket or warning notice, and the tickets
and warnings contained biographical information about the driver. On the back of these
receipts deputies would indicate whether a search occurred during the stop, and if so, what type
of search. Telephone Interview with Roger Roy, Reporter Orlando Sentinel (July 24, 1997).
94. See Roy & Curtis, supra note 91, at Al.
95. Id. From January 1996 through April 1997, he detained over one thousand drivers,
the most among his Unit. Id.
96. Id.




Emphasis Team, while black male drivers received only 24.2% of the
traffic citations issued by other North Carolina troopers patrolling the
same highways. The report explained that statistical experts believed
that it was "'wildly improbable'" that two groups of troopers
patrolling the same highways would produce such disparate results
by chance. 99 The supervising sergeant for the Special Emphasis
Team, like other government officials, refused to disclose what
criteria troopers use in determining which cars to search. But the
News & Observer report determined that in 1995, the "Special
Emphasis Team searched about 3,501 vehicles and found drugs in
210-about one in every 17 vehicles searched."100 According to the
sergeant, his squad was doing a good job and the success rate was
good enough: "'You may have had 17 cars searched where drugs are
only found one time,' he said. 'But that's not to say that that person
who didn't have it wasn't involved.' -101
B. Why Should Evidence of Racial Impact Matter?
While reasonable minds may differ over whether contraband
found in only one of every seventeen vehicles searched (a five percent
payoff) is worth the cost in constitutional liberty and privacy that is
imposed by these intrusions, the above statistics on traffic stops in
New Jersey, Maryland, Florida, and North Carolina should raise
judicial eyebrows and trigger Fourth Amendment questions
concerning the enforcement practices of officers in these jurisdictions.
As the official who trained the Orange County drug squad noted,
police statistics on traffic stops "should reflect the ratio of people who
99. Joseph Neff & Pat Stith, Could it Happen by Chance? NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
North Carolina), July 28, 1996, at A15. The report explained:
Could the different racial patterns in citations issued by the Special Emphasis Team
and other troopers be a coincidence?... For the Special Emphasis Team, the statistical
question is this: If the two groups of troopers are equal in their propensity to ticket
black men, how often would such differing results occur? The most common method is
to use the Chi square test. When applied to citations issued on Interstates 85 and 95 by
the Special Emphasis Team and other troopers, the test gives an answer of 515. This
answer is off the chart. As answer of 6.6 means the odds are one in a hundred. An
answer of 10.8 means such a divergence would happen one in a thousand. College
textbook charts end there. An answer of 515 is so far off the chart that the odds are in
the millions or billions to one, according to statistical experts. '"This is a wildly im-
probable difference," said Phil Meyer, a professor ofjournalism at UNC-Chapel Hill who
has written extensively on the use of numbers. "Something other than chance is causing
it..
Id.
100. Neff & Stith, supra note 2, at Al.
101. Id.
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are passing through or reside in the area, neighborhood or on the
highway."10 2
In the constitutional context of equal protection, similar statis-
tical evidence has failed to prove that a particular state actor or group
of actors acted with a specific intent to discriminate.103 The same
might be said about these statistics: While they indicate substantial
racial disparities in the percentage of black motorists that troopers
stop and search, the statistics do not prove that any particular officer
discriminated against any particular black motorist. Like other pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights that have been interpreted to incorporate
equality norms as part of the substantive right accorded by the provi-
sion,104 the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches
102. Roy & Curtis, supra note 91, at Al. Cf. Hecker, supra note 43, at 569 (noting while
some of the statistical disparity of black motorists stopped "may be justified if, in fact, race is
probative of drug activity or correlates with race-neutral factors that are probative of drug
activity," it is unlikely that the vast disparity of blacks stopped for traffic violations can be
explained by legitimate reasons).
103. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291-92 (1987) (holding that a
comprehensive statistical study showing that black defendants who kill white victims have the
greatest chance of receiving the death penalty in Georgia is insufficient to prove a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause because the defendant "must prove that the decision makers in his
case acted with discriminatory purpose"); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (finding the
fact that black applicants failed test given to applicants for police force at a rate four times
higher than white applicants does not constitute equal protection violation; disproportionate
racial impact, standing alone, does not trigger strict judicial scrutiny of a facially neutral statute
or law).
104. Indeed, because equal treatment under the law is such a fundamental value under the
Constitution and for individual liberties, the Court has not confined equality norms to the
exclusive province of the Equal Protection Clause. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DImusT (1980); LAuRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTTrIONAL LAW § 16-1, at 1437 (2d
ed. 1988) ("[No single clause or provision [of the Constitution] is the exclusive fount of [equality]
doctrine."). Several parts of the Constitution and provisions of the Bill of Rights have been
interpreted to incorporate equality norms as part of the substantive right accorded by the
provision.
For example, the scope of the First Amendment's right of free speech is informed by equality
norms. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972). See generally Kenneth
L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHm. L. REv. 20 (1975).
Similarly, the Eighth Amendment's ban against cruel and unusual punishment has been read to
incorporate a principle of equality. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 323 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting),
stating:
While the Equal Protection clause forbids racial discrimination, and intent may be
critical in a successful claim under that provision, the Eighth Amendment has its own
distinct focus: whether punishment comports with social standards of rationality and
decency. It may be, as in this case, that on occasion an influence that makes
punishment arbitrary is also proscribed under another constitutional provision. That
does not mean, however, that the standard for determining an Eighth Amendment
violation is superseded by the standard for determining a violation under this other
provision[.J
Id. at 341 ("That a decision to impose the death penalty could be influenced by race is thus a
particularly repugnant prospect, and evidence that race may play even a modest role in levying
a death sentence should be enough to characterize that sentence as 'cruel and unusual.");
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and seizures is sufficiently important and spacious enough to include
a concern with equality. Further, the history and purpose of the
Fourth Amendment provide ample justification for embracing equality
norms when deciding the reasonableness of an intrusion. At its core,
the Amendment is aimed at discretionary police power. Traffic enfor-
cement obviously affords police officers "a good deal of low visibility
discretion. In addition they are likely in such situations to be sensi-
tive to social station and other factors that should not bear on the
decision."10 5 Therefore, where unequal or arbitrary enforcement ex-
ists, the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment is properly
directed at such intrusions and "can be seen as another harbinger of
the Equal Protection Clause, concerned with avoiding indefensible
inequities in treatment."06 Moreover, because these statistics do not
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that the chal-
lenged death penalty statutes "are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an in-
gredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban
on 'cruel and unusual' punishments"); id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) (concluding that
although racial discrimination was not proven, the Eighth Amendment "cannot tolerate the
infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so
wantonly and so freakishly imposed."); ELY, supra, at 97 (noting that the protection against
cruel and unusual punishment "surely had to do with a realization that in the context of
imposing penalties.., there is tremendous potential for the arbitrary or invidious infliction of
'unusually' severe punishments on persons of various classes other than 'our own.' ").
Finally, a generation ago, when litigants challenged discriminatory conduct by federal
officials, the Court adopted a literal interpretation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause and rejected the contention that the federal government was controlled by equality
norms. See, e.g., Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337 (1943) (noting that because
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause contains no explicit equal protection clause, it
imposes "no guaranty against discriminatory legislation by Congress"). The modem Court has
repudiated this approach. It now reads the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause to impose
on federal officials the same equality norms that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes upon the
states. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213-17 (1995); Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954) (recognizing that the "liberty" component of the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause protects the same equality principles embodied in the Fourteenth Amendments
Equal Protection Clause). In fact, "the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments have... been held to yield norms of equal treatment indistinguishable from those
of the equal protection clause." TRIBE, supra, § 16-1, at 1437 (citations omitted). When
individual liberties are jeopardized by discriminatory and arbitrary government action,
"principles of equal treatment have emerged in ways fairly independent of particular
constitutional phrases." Id.; see also Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986) (holding that
because the risk of racial prejudice may have affected his capital sentencing, the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of an impartial jury entitled a black defendant accused of capital
murder involving an interracial crime the right to inform prospective jurors of the race of the
victim and to question those jurors on the issue of racial bias).
105. ELY, supra note 104, at 97.
106. Id.; see also Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion By Administrative Regulations:
The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment Adjudication,
89 MICH. L. REv. 442, 449 (1990) ("Protection against arbitrary searches and seizures lies in
controlling police discretion, which requires a determination that the police action taken against
a particular individual corresponds to that which occurs with respect to other persons similarly
situated.").
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show actual racial discrimination in a particular case does not render
them constitutionally worthless. On the contrary, the statistics,
considered as a whole, provide concrete evidence that state police
officers are targeting black motorists for unwarranted narcotics inves-
tigations under the guise of traffic enforcement. The statistics indi-
cate large-scale, arbitrary, and biased police seizures that implicate
essential Fourth Amendment protections.107
The statistical disparities discussed above cannot be explained
away by claiming that blacks are worse drivers than whites, simply
because there is no evidence that blacks as a group drive differently
from whites 3 8 When statistical surveys indicate the type and degree
of racial disparities shown above, courts should, at the very least,
require state officials to provide race-neutral explanations for the
statistics. 10 9 When officials cannot explain the disparities, then the
statistics offer conclusive evidence that race matters in predicting
which types of motorists are more likely to be stopped for traffic of-
fenses, and which vehicles will probably be searched during such
stops. Under this model, if the State is unable to rebut the statistical
proof that race matters in making traffic stops, the defense has
established a Fourth Amendment violation notwithstanding probable
cause for a particular traffic stop.
Nor should this statistical evidence be dismissed because the
Whren Court stated that the subjective motives of an officer will not
undermine "objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth
107. The disparate impact of the statistics illustrates another reason why constitutional
analysis of race-based seizures should include Fourth Amendment norms, as well as equal
protection precepts. Under traditional equal protection rules, governmental conduct that causes
a disparate racial impact alone does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court rejected
a disparate impact test for equal protection cases because it feared that such a rule "would be
far reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of
tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to
the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white." Davis, 426 U.S. at 248.
Under the Fourth Amendment, however, a judge could find that the traffic stops revealed by
these statistics violate the Fourth Amendments prohibition against unreasonable seizures
because of their disparate and arbitrary impact on black motorists without fear that her ruling
could be used to invalidate other types of governmental conduct unrelated to police searches and
seizures that have a disparate impact on blacks or other discrete and insular groups.
108. In Pedro Soto, the head of the New Jersey State Police and individual troopers all
'testified that blacks drive indistinguishably from whites." Letter from Judge Francis, supra
note 56, at 6. In addition, Dr. James Fyfe, a criminal justice professor and qualified expert in
police science and police procedures testified that "there is nothing in the literature or in his
personal experience to support the theory that blacks drive differently from whites." Id.
(footnote omitted).
109. In Pedro Soto, the prosecution did attempt to rebut the statistical proof offered by the
defense, but Judge Francis concluded that the prosecution's expert witness did not undermine
the validity or accuracy of the defense's statistical evidence. See id.
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Amendment."" 0 The statistical data proffered in Pedro Soto and
Wilkins, and uncovered in Orange County, Florida, and North
Carolina does not purport to measure the subjective motives of offi-
cers. On the contrary, this evidence depicts the racial composition of
motorists eligible for traffic stops, and describes which motorists are
actually stopped and searched by the police, regardless of the subjec-
tive bias or motives of individual officers. This empirical data pro-
vides the type of specific and articulable evidence that the Court
traditionally looks for in Fourth Amendment cases."' Moreover, the
statistical evidence developed in these cases and obtained from police
records is more probative than other evidence the Court has sanc-
tioned when judging the reasonableness of investigative detentions
and searches." 2
For example, in United States v. Sokolow, the Ninth Circuit
invalidated an investigatory stop because federal drug agents did not
have reasonable suspicion to justify the detention."8 Believing the
agents to have relied on a "drug courier profile" to seize Sokolow,"4
the appellate court ruled that the drug courier profile by itself could
not provide the basis for a lawful seizure. The court explained that
personal characteristics of suspected drug couriers, such as nervous-
ness, style of dress, type of luggage, and destination or arrival cities,
would not support a finding of reasonable suspicion unless agents
provided "[eimpirical documentation" that "'innocent' behavior is not
so innocent."" 5
110. Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996).
111. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) ("[In justifying a particular intrusion the
police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.") (footnote omitted).
112. See infra notes 113-20 and accompanying text.
113. See 831 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
114. Since 1974, the Drug Enforcement Administration has developed a "drug courier
profile" which is based on characteristics generally associated with narcotics traffickers.
Federal and state agents have been trained to identify suspected drug smugglers based on
characteristics contained in the profile. See Morgan Cloud, Search and Seizure By The
Numbers: The Drug Courier Profile And Judicial Review of Investigative Formulas, 65 B.U. L.
REV. 843, 847 (1985); Yale Kamisar, The Fourth Amendment, in THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS
AND DEVELOPMENTS 119, 133-43 (Dorothy Opperman ed., 1981).
115. Sokolow, 831 F.2d at 1420; see also United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 397 (8th
Cir. 1992) (Arnold, C.J., dissenting) (noting the lack of empirical evidence to support the agent's
claim that drug courier passengers exhibit a degree of nervousness more pronounced than
innocent airline passengers, and that young black males from Los Angeles were more prone to
be drug couriers than young white males; "[tihis [empirical evidence], which we never seem to
get in [drug profile] cases, would go far towards enabling us to say whether the kind of police
tactic we have before us is reasonable, which is, after all, the controlling criteria in applying the
Fourth Amendment").
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In the Supreme Court, the government argued, inter alia, that
the Ninth Circuit's ruling placed an impossible evidentiary burden on
the government. The government submitted:
Contrary to the court of appeals' assumption, the kinds of factors that are
important to experienced agents in deciding whether to stop a person traveling
through an airport are not readily susceptible to empirical or statistical proof.
It is difficult to assign a numerical value to nervousness for statistical
purposes. The significance of other incongruities in demeanor, behavior, or
dress are equally difficult to quantify. In a case such as this one, how could
the government be expected to present statistical evidence regarding the
likelihood that a person taking a four-day trip from Honolulu to Miami and
back (via an indirect route) would be returning with narcotics? By ordering
experienced narcotics agents to justify their investigative decisions with
statistical proof, the court of appeals has essentially rejected the use of
inference based on common sense and the shared experience of agents in the
field."16
Reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision, the Court agreed with
the government's position that empirical proof was unnecessary to
satisfy Fourth Amendment standards in this context.117 When decid-
ing whether there is reasonable suspicion for a specific detention, the
Court stated that one "must consider 'the totality of the circum-
stances-the whole picture.' "118
The point here is not to reexamine the soundness of Sokolow,
but to note that the Court has not imposed high standards on the type
of evidence it will consider when deciding whether an investigative
detention satisfies the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness require-
ment. Not only did the government fail to provide empirical proof for
its claim that the drug courier profile has reliable predictive value,
but there was reason to believe that "most of the drug courier profile
characteristics appearing in the caselaw do not accurately describe
the behaviors of actual drug couriers and generally are not relied
upon by the police."" 9
In terms of empirical quality, the statistical evidence devel-
oped in Pedro Soto and Wilkins is substantially more credible and
reliable than the evidence accepted in Sokolow. In contrast to the
government's evidence in Sokolow, the claims of racial impact con-
116. Brief for the United States at 33-34, United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (No.
87-1295) (emphasis added).
117. The Court, however, did not explicitly endorse the government's "trust the 'common
sense' of federal agents" standard for measuring reasonable suspicion.
118. Soholow, 490 U.S. at 8 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417 (1981)).
119. Cloud, supra note 114, at 884.
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nected with pretextual traffic stops are "susceptible to empirical and
statistical proof."20 The statistics showing arbitrary and biased stops
in New Jersey and Maryland have been subjected to adversarial chal-
lenge, and courts can test and refute future complaints of racial tar-
geting when the government provides neutral explanations for the
racial disparities.
Furthermore, if, as explained in Sokolow, the reasonableness
requirement of the Fourth Amendment dictates an analysis that con-
siders "the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture," the
question arises why empirically sound statistical evidence showing
the relevance of race in traffic stops is not part of "the whole picture."
Where such evidence exists, at a minimum, the burden should be on
the government to show why this evidence should be omitted from the
Court's analysis when considering the constitutional validity of pre-
textual traffic stops.
It begs the constitutional question to assert that "[a]s a general
matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the
police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has oc-
curred."121 The issue is the reasonableness of police officers targeting
and stopping black and Hispanic drivers for traffic violations in order
to intercept narcotics. That an officer had probable cause of a traffic
violation should not end the Fourth Amendment inquiry. It does not
require a radical view of the Fourth Amendment to believe that the
manner in which a particular intrusion is effectuated-even one
authorized by a warrant or valid exception to the warrant require-
ment-must satisfy the reasonableness test of the Fourth
Amendment.12  A traffic stop, even one supported by probable cause,
120. The government conceded that the criteria of the drug courier profile are "not
susceptible to empirical or statistical proof." Brief for the United States at 33, Sokolow (No. 87-
1295).
121. Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996); see also id. at 1776 ("With rare
exceptions not applicable [to pretext stops], the result of [the Fourth Amendment's] balancing is
not in doubt where the search or seizure is based upon probable cause.").
122. The Whren Court intimated that where probable cause exists, judicial scrutiny of the
manner in which a search or seizure is effectuated is required only where the challenged
intrusion is "conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to an individual's
privacy or even physical interests." Id. at 1776-77 (citing cases involving deadly force, forcible
entries into private homes, and physical penetration of one's body). A routine traffic step by
plain clothes officers, according to Whren, "does not remotely qualify as such an extreme
practice, and so is governed by the usual rule that probable cause to believe the law has been
broken 'outbalances' private interest in avoiding police contact." Id. at 1777.
It is not surprising that the Court would consider evaluating the reasonableness of pretex-
tual traffic stops a waste of judicial time and resources. The Court sees the stop in
Whren-officers brazenly violating departmental rules to step a vehicle with two black males on
pretextual traffic charges in order to pursue a hunch that the occupants were drug dealers-as
"the run-of-the-mine case." Id. From a police perspective the Court is right; stepping black
360 [Vol. 51:333
1998] RACE AND THE FOURTHAMENDMENT 361
is unreasonable if it is the product of racial targeting.123 Imagine, for
example, empirical evidence indicating that police are targeting mo-
torists for traffic stops based on the political views expressed in a
bumper sticker.124 Also, in each case, an officer has probable cause
that the motorist with the suspect bumper sticker did commit a traffic
infraction. These hypothetical seizures not only violate norms embod-
ied in the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause,125 but they also
imperil Fourth Amendment values because they constitute arbitrary
and biased seizures. 26
drivers for dubious traffic offenses is routine. From the perspective of a black motorist, how-
ever, this type of seizure is never routine and always insulting. See Don Jackson, Police
Embody Racism To My People, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1989, at A25, stating:.
The black American finds that the most prominent reminder of his second-class
citizenship are the police.... Operating free of constitutional limitations, the police
have long been the greatest nemesis of blacks, irrespective of whether we are complying
with the law or not. We have learned that there are cars we are not suppose to drive,
streets we are not suppose to walk. We may still be stopped and asked "Where are you
going, boy?" Whether we're in a Mercedes or a Volkswagen.
Id.
123. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 416 (1974) (stating that our Fourth Amendment rights should not depend upon "the state of
the digestion of any officer who stops us-or, more likely, upon our obsequiousness, the price of
our automobiles, the formality of our dress, the shortness of our hair or the color of our skin");
cf. KENNEDY, supra note 35, at 162. In his excellent book, Professor Kennedy states that
"[elveryone-ordinary citizens, legislators, police officials, judges, and so on-should demand
that race play no routine role in decisionmaking regarding whom to scrutinize for purposes of
law enforcement." Id. But Professor Kennedy acknowledges, on the other hand, that "[i]f [the]
police would be legally justified in detaining an individual in the absence of the race factor, but
the police nonetheless used race in their calculation, the detention would be ruled legal-but the
police would also be subject to administrative and legal penalties for having utilized a prohibited
criterion." Id.
124. See Respondent's Brief at App. 9A, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (No. 77-
1571) (describing a 1969 study where 15 college students with good driving records affixed a
Black Panther bumper sticker to their cars; within 17 days, the students had been issued 33
traffic citations, and a researcher found that "'it is statistically unlikely that this number of
previously "safe" drivers could amass such a collection of tickets without assuming real bias by
police against drivers with Black Panther bumper stickers'").
125. Cf. Karst, supra note 104, at 29-30, stating:
The equality principle, viewed as a barrier against content censorship, also implicitly
underlies the elaborate [F]irst [A]mendment doctrines that prohibit giving officials
discretion to decide when speech shall be permitted and when it shall be punished or the
speaker denied a license.... It is not accidental that these [F]irst [A]mendment
doctrines serve equality not only at the level of principle but also at a practical level,
defending nonconformists, dissenters, and the disadvantaged. The principle of equal
liberty of expression, like the equal protection clause, has special relevance for
protecting the downtrodden.
126. But cf. Holland v. City of Portland, 102 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding that an
arrest motivated by a suspect's refusal to identify himself does not violate the Fourth
Amendment if there are other objective grounds for the arrest and "any attempt to untangle the
ascribed motive from a skein of others, in prompting an arrest justified by objective probable
cause, would invite exactly the inquiry into police motivation condemned by Whren").
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Ultimately, the Whren Court casually sanctioned the "costs"
imposed on black motorists by pretextual stops because of its
unwillingness to perform a balancing analysis for an "exceedingly
important issue regarding a pervasive law enforcement practice"127
which has caused consternation among large segments of the minority
community. Perhaps, if such a balancing analysis had been
performed, the Court might have still ruled in favor of the
government, albeit under a different rationale. Alternatively, a
balancing analysis that actually weighed the costs and benefits
associated with race-based pretextual traffic stops might have
prompted the Court to conclude that such seizures are
"unreasonable," despite the existence of probable cause for a traffic
stop.128 The Whren Court, however, found the burden of pretextual
stops on black motorists so insignificant that it saw no reason to
perform any balancing analysis. The Court's performance and
judgment on this point is a perfect illustration of why many blacks
feel like second-class citizens in America's judicial system.
III. THE LINKAGE BETWEEN RACE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Evidence of police targeting black motorists for pretextual
traffic stops reveals a phenomenon that merited the Court's attention
in Whren, even under conventional Fourth Amendment analysis.
Instead of addressing this conduct, however, the Court reaffirmed its
view that Fourth Amendment values are not implicated by race-based
seizures. The Court cannot justify its failure to scrutinize race-based
seizures under the reasonableness standard of the Fourth
Amendment by claiming that evidence of racial targeting merely re-
flects the subjective intent of individual officers, which is without
value for Fourth Amendment purposes. On the contrary, evidence of
racial targeting provides concrete and objective information on the
racial populations of motorists stopped by police officers. Absent a
race-neutral explanation, this evidence shows that police officers are
targeting black and other minority motorists in an arbitrary and
biased fashion, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.129 But the
Whren Court's separation of racial concerns from Fourth Amendment
norms is wrong for another reason: Earlier cases have demonstrated
127. LAFAVE, supra note 43, § 1.4, at 13.
128. See infra notes 177-80, 190-200 and accompanying text.
129. See supra Part II for discussion of this data.
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that racial factors are relevant when adjudicating Fourth Amendment
issues.
After the civil unrest and urban violence of the 1960s, a
Presidential Panel, the Kerner Commission, 130 found that hostility
between the police and the black community was a contributing fac-
tor, and in some places, the factor, precipitating riots in several urban
centers. As the Commission remarked, "Negroes firmly believe that
police brutality and harassment occur repeatedly in Negro neighbor-
hoods. This belief is unquestionably one of the major reasons for in-
tense Negro resentment against the police."' 3' Three months after the
Commission issued its report, the Supreme Court decided Terry v.
Ohio.132 Terry concerned a police procedure that was a source of
enormous tension between the police and black Americans: stopping
and frisking individuals on the street.33
At first glance, Terry v. Ohio was a simple case, unrelated to
police harassment of or brutality against urban blacks. 34 Terry
130. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968)
[herinafter Kerner Commission].
131. Id. at 158. Another Presidential Panel had issued similar findings a year earlier. See
UNITED STATES PRESIDENTS COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 184 (1967). The report stated that:
Misuse of field interrogation... is causing serious friction with minority groups in many
localities. This is becoming particularly true as more police departments adopt
"aggressive patrol" in which officers are encouraged routinely to stop and question
persons on the street who are unknown to them, who are suspicious, or whose purpose
for being abroad is not readily evident. The Michigan State survey found that both
minority group leaders and persons sympathetic to minority groups throughout the
country were almost unanimous in labeling field interrogation as a principal problem in
police community relations.
Id.
132. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
133. Kerner Commission, supra note 130, at 159-60 (noting that police departments,
reacting to concerns about crime, have begun aggressive patrol practices, including stop and
frisk tactics, "without weighing their tension-creating effects [for the Negro community] and the
resulting relationship to civil disorder"). The brief filed by the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc., left no doubt about the tensions caused by stop and frisk tactics in black
neighborhoods:
[Tihe ill effects of stop and frisk practices, particularly in the ghetto, is as strong at least
as any evidence of their good effects "from a purely law enforcement point of
view."... We are gravely concerned by the dangers of legitimating stop and frisk, and
thus encouraging, and increasing the frequency of occasions for, police-citizen
aggressions. Speaking bluntly, we believe that what the ghetto does not need is more stop
and frisk.
Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae at 60-62,
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Nos. 63, 74 & 67) (quoting Herman Goldstein, Police Policy
Formulation: A Proposal for Improving Police Performance, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1123, 1140 (1967)
(emphasis added)).
134. Cf. Gary Peller, Criminal Law, Race, and the Ideology of Bias: Transcending the
Critical Tools of the Sixties, 67 TuL. L. REv. 2231, 2245 (1993) (arguing that the opinions of the
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concerned the constitutionality of frisking a suspect for weapons
where police did not have probable cause for an arrest.135 Prior to
Terry, the Court had never upheld a seizure of a person in the absence
of probable cause that a crime had occurred. But an overwhelming
majority in Terry held that a frisk was permissible where an officer
had specific and articulable facts-reasonable suspicion-to believe
that a person was armed and dangerous. 1"6 Though the Court
acknowledged that the case "thrusts to the fore difficult and
troublesome issues regarding a sensitive area of police activity,"1 7 the
result in Terry turned on the practical concern that officers be
permitted to protect themselves during potentially dangerous street
encounters. 18
While the Court's ruling and rationale were straightforward,
another aspect of Terry gave the Court some difficulty. The Court
acknowledged that police initiate street confrontations for a host of
reasons. It noted that some confrontations "are wholly unrelated to a
desire to prosecute for crime" and some undoubtedly violate the
Fourth Amendment."39 The Court also recognized that certain police
practices, including stop and frisk tactics, disproportionately impact
certain groups within society, particularly urban blacks, and can
exacerbate tensions between the police and the minority
community.140 And though the Court ultimately upheld the frisking of
individuals on less than probable cause, the racial impact connected
with "aggressive patrol" techniques and stop and frisk policies
noticeably troubled the Court. In fact, the Court signaled, albeit in an
enigmatic footnote, that the judiciary must consider racial impact
when determining the constitutional reasonableness of an intrusion.
Referring to police practices that generated tensions within the black
community, the Court noted:
Warren Court "proceed in a colorblind frame, implying that race was not central to the decisions
because the cases presented universal issues of the relations between the State and individuals"
and "the defendants in cases like Terry v. Ohio just 'happened to be black' ").
135. Terry, 392 U.S. at 15.
136. Id. at 21-22.
137. Id. at 9.
138. See ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 466-68 (1997) (noting
Chief Justice Warren's concerns that frisking dangerous suspects was essential to protect the
lives of police officers); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME
COURT-A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 686 (1983) (same).
139. Terry, 392 U.S. at 13-14 ("Doubtless some police Tield interrogation' conduct violates
the Fourth Amendment.").
140. Id. at 14-15 n.11. Professor Schwartz's article discusses in greater detail the scholarly
and empirical evidence regarding the impact that stop and frisk practices have on black citizens.
See generally Schwartz, supra note 35.
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We have noted that the abusive practices which play a major, though by no
means exclusive, role in creating this friction are not susceptible of control by
means of the exclusionary rule, and cannot properly dictate our decision with
respect to the powers of the police in genuine investigative and preventive
situations. However, the degree of community resentment aroused by
particular practices is clearly [relevant] to an assessment of the quality of the
intrusion upon reasonable expectations of personal security caused by those
practices. 141
Terry was the Court's first Fourth Amendment ruling to ac-
knowledge that a police intrusion may cause adverse racial tensions
and to mandate judicial assessment of that negative impact when
analyzing the reasonableness of the intrusion. Unfortunately, the
modern Court has neglected this component of Terry's analysis; how-
ever, the Court has not made race a forbidden topic when measuring
the reasonableness of seizures. On the contrary, where the govern-
141. Terry, 392 U.S. at 17 n.14 (emphasis added). Professor Schwartz has taken a very
different view of this matter. She has argued that while the Terry Court recognized the racial
impact that stop and frisk policies had on black individuals, the Court explicitly made facts and
legal arguments about race irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis. See, e.g., Schwartz,
supra note 35, at 346 ("[Tlhe Terry majority adopted the N.A.A.C.P.'s empirical contentions
about the extent and causes of racial disparity in the incidence of stops and frisks only to
conclude that such considerations are irrelevant to delineating the proper standard for stops
and frisks."). Professor Schwartz correctly points out that racial impact should have played a
more prominent role in the Terry Court's Fourth Amendment analysis. I disagree, however,
with her conclusion that the reasoning of Terry made arguments about race irrelevant to search
and seizure law. See id. at 349 ("Many scholars have failed to recognize that Terry argued
explicitly for the irrelevance of facts about racial impact.").
Concerns about the racial consequences of stop and frisk practices clearly occupied a subor-
dinate position in comparison with Terry's concerns about police safety and violent crime. But
the evidence of racial harassment, albeit not decisive to the Court's holding, "was a matter of
great concern to the Court." Wayne R. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution:
Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 59 (1968).
Regrettably, the Court's recognition of the relevance of racial impact to Fourth Amendment
norms was smothered by an extensive commentary on the limits of the exclusionary rule as ajudicial device to control certain police tactics. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 13-15. The Court seemed
to suggest that certain police tactics, including illegitimate harassment of racial minorities,
were beyond the control of the judiciary. See, e.g., id. ("Yet a rigid and unthinking application of
the exclusionary rule, in futile protest against practices which it can never be used effectively to
control, may exact a high toll in human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent crime.").
Professor Schwartz reads this portion of Terry to establish the proposition that the exclusionary
rule is helpless to prevent police from stopping and frisking citizens because of their race. See
Schwartz, supra note 35, at 348. But the Court's comments do not extend that far. Instead, the
Court was merely explaining, as it did in the textual passage that precedes this footnote, that
the exclusionary rule is not a cure-all for all forms of police misconduct. "The exclusionary
rule... cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products of legitimate police investigative
techniques on the ground that much conduct which is closely similar involves unwarranted
intrusions upon constitutional protections." Terry, 392 U.S. at 13. Put simply, the exclusionary
rule cannot be a "blunderbuss" to reach illegitimate police practices. See LaFave, supra, at 62.




ment submits that racial factors promote law enforcement interests,
the Court freely discusses race and has explicitly allowed race-based
seizures in some Fourth Amendment contexts.
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, federal Border Patrol
agents stopped the respondent's car near the Mexican border because
the three occupants appeared to be of Mexican ancestry 42 While the
agents found that the vehicle contained illegal aliens, the Court ruled
the stop unconstitutional because the occupants' Mexican appearance
alone did not give the officers reasonable suspicion of illegal alien
smuggling.'4 Although Brignoni-Ponce invalidated the specific sei-
zure at issue, much in the Court's opinion weakened Fourth
Amendment protections.
First, the Court explained that roving border patrols did not
need probable cause to stop vehicles traveling on roads within one
hundred miles of the border. Reasonable suspicion would suffice.'"
In deciding whether there is reasonable suspicion to stop a car in the
border area,145 the Court stated that Mexican appearance is a rele-
vant, but not dispositive, factor.1
This last point, of course, was the heart of the case. Although
the border agents' sole justification for the stop in Brignoni-Ponce was
the occupants' apparent Mexican ancestry, the Court seemed skepti-
cal about the ability of agents to recognize the ethnicity of individuals
traveling along interstate highways at night. 47 Moreover, even if
agents could truly recognize the ethnicity of motorists, ethnic appear-
ance alone would "justify neither a reasonable belief that they were
aliens, nor a reasonable belief that the car concealed other aliens who
were illegally in the country."148 Many American citizens share "the
physical characteristics identified with Mexican ancestry, and even in
142. 422 U.S. 873, 875 (1975).
143. See id. at 885-86.
144. See id. at 884. Prior to Brignoni-Ponce, probable cause was the constitutional stan-
dard for judging the validity of an automobile seizure or search. See Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925). While the Court had conceded that there is often a "troublesome
line... between mere suspicion and probable cause," Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
176 (1949), the Court reaffirmed the notion that moving vehicles could not be stopped or
searched on less than probable cause of criminal activity. See id. at 164-71.
145. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884. The Court approvingly noted several criteria
which might establish reasonable suspicion. The Court repeated, but did not expressly endorse,
the government's assertion that "trained officers can recognize the characteristic appearance of
persons who live in Mexico, relying on such factors as the mode of dress and haircut." Id at
885.
146. See id. at 887.
147. See id. at 886 ("At best the officers had only a fleeting glimpse of the persons in the
moving car, illuminated by headlights.").
148. Id.
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the border area a relatively small proportion of them are aliens."49
Thus, according to the Court, the probability that "any given person of
Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican appear-
ance a relevant factor, but standing alone it does not justify stopping
all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are aliens."150
Within limited circumstances, Brignoni-Ponce permitted racial
and ethnic traits to be legitimate factors in determining whether an
investigative stop was reasonable. Within a year, however, the Court
gave the border patrol additional discretionary authority to use race
and ethnicity and justified its result with statistical evidence. In
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, the Court held that the Fourth
Amendment permitted the seizure of vehicles at fixed checkpoints
away from the border even in the absence of individualized suspicion
that a particular car contained illegal aliens.,5' The Court stated that
officers could rely on the appearance of Mexican ancestry as
justification for the selective referral of motorists to a "secondary
inspection" area for questioning. 52
In reaching this result, the Court stressed the important
national interest in stemming the influx of illegal aliens, the difficulty
of detecting smuggling, and the minimal nature of the intrusion
involved at fixed checkpoints. The Court resolved the inconsistency
between selective seizures on the basis of ethnicity and the Fourth
Amendment's purpose of restraining police discretion and barring
arbitrary seizures by noting two details. First, the Court pointed to
the government's submission that agents rely on factors besides eth-
nicity when making selective referrals and noted the statistical evi-
dence supporting this assertion.153 Second, the Court suggested that
use of ethnicity was a successful law enforcement tool.'54
149. Id.
150. Id. at 886-87.
151. See 428 U.S. 543, 562 (1976).
152. See id. at 563 (holding that it is permissible to "refer motorists selectively to the sec-
ondary inspection area... on the basis of criteria that would not sustain a roving-patrol stop.
Thus, even if it be assumed that such referrals are made largely on the basis of apparent
Mexican ancestry, we perceive no constitutional violation").
153. The Court explained that while Mexican-Americans and legal resident aliens of
Mexican ancestry represented a significant percentage of the population of California, less than
one percent of the cars passing through the checkpoint are stopped for questioning. In addition,
the Court opined that if the percentages of persons in California with Spanish-speaking skills or
possessing Spanish surnames were applied to the approximately 146,000 cars traveling through
the checkpoint, one would expect that almost 23,400 vehicles would contain persons of Spanish
or Mexican origin, "yet only 820 were referred to the secondary area. This appears to refute any
suggestion that the Border Patrol relies extensively on apparent Mexican ancestry standing
alone in referring motorists to the secondary area." Id. at 563 n.16.
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Terry, Brignoni-Ponce, and Martinez-Fuerte indicate, albeit in
different ways, that race matters in the adjudication of Fourth
Amendment questions. The Terry Court acknowledged the racial
impact and tensions caused by stop and frisk practices. 155 Terry rec-
ognized that police often deploy stop and frisk policies in black neigh-
borhoods or against individual blacks in a disparate manner and that
these policies and procedures generate friction between the police and
black Americans.
Further, the Terry Court made the degree of resentment in the
black community provoked by frisking a relevant factor in deciding
the reasonableness of frisking under the Fourth Amendment.156 Thus,
where convincing evidence shows that a particular practice adversely
affects a segment of the community, this evidence merits judicial
attention. The Court does not promote Fourth Amendment values by
ignoring evidence of racial impact. True, the Court interprets the
Fourth Amendments command as general reasonableness, which
typically involves an analysis of objective factors. 157 But if evidence
shows that police use particular search and seizure methods in black
The statistics cited by the Court do not refute the claim that Border Agents were relying
exclusively on ethnicity in deciding which motorists to question. It is true that because Border
Agents were looking for Mexicans illegally entering the country, and given the significant
percentage of Hispanic persons represented in California's population, one might have expected
a larger percentage of motorists to be stopped and questioned by Border Agents. But simply
because less than one percent of the cars passing through the checkpoint were stopped does not
mean that the Hispanic motorists who were selected for questioning were not targeted because
of their ethnic background. Like other governmental actors, Border Agents have limited time
and resources to conduct their duties. Given additional time and resources, one would expect
that a greater percentage of motorists would have been stopped and questioned.
154. Echoing the motto that "nothing works like success," the Court noted: "Of the 820
vehicles referred to the secondary inspection area... roughly 20% contained illegal aliens.
Thus, to the extent that the Border Patrol relies on apparent Mexican ancestry at this check-
point ... that reliance clearly is relevant to the law enforcement need to be served." Id. at 564
n.17.
155. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 35, at 360-75 (noting empirical studies indicating that blacks
are more likely to be stopped and frisked than whites, and urging that racial impact be a factor
in Fourth Amendment analysis, but resisting a change in substantive Fourth Amendment
standards until further research can identify the causes of racially disparate intrusions); Brief
for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae at 58-69, Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Nos. 63, 74 & 67).
156. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 17 n.14. Cf. Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 25, at
1518:
[Clourts should realize that police may often inflict the sorts of injuries classically
thought to arise when the government acts discriminatorily, and should apply a [Flourth
[A]mendment balance that takes account of citizens' interest in avoiding such injuries.
Rather than inquiring merely into the extent a given police action infringes on a
citizen's freedom, courts should also ask to what extent the action discriminatorily
injures the individual and the racial group to which the individual belongs.
157. See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248,
250-51 (1991); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 178 (1990).
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neighborhoods or against minorities in a disparate way, that evidence
is no less objective than other factors considered by the Court.
Indeed, where such evidence exists, as it did in Terry, it would be
irresponsible not to consider this evidence as part of the "totality of
the circumstances" for determining the reasonableness of the intru-
sion. At a minimum, where evidence of racial impact exists, the bur-
den should be on those who advocate ignoring such evidence to
explain why evidence of racial impact should not form part of the
"totality" analysis.
Of course, one might respond that this approach would require
different Fourth Amendment standards for different groups or indi-
viduals depending on race, ethnicity, or cultural makeup of the neigh-
borhood. Consideration of racial impact, however, does not compel a
"double standard" or outcome-determinative rule under the Fourth
Amendment. Search and seizure law seldom turns on the considera-
tion of a single factor. The modern Court interprets the Fourth
Amendment to require reasonableness in official searches and sei-
zures, and reasonableness is, more often than not, determined by
balancing the nature and degree of the intrusion on the individual
against the public interests served by the intrusion.
For example, the Court applies a totality test to decide
whether a police intrusion triggers Fourth Amendment protection. In
Bostick, the Court considered whether police questioning of a passen-
ger seated on a bus during a stopover of an interstate trip constituted
a seizure. The fact that the passenger did not feel free to leave the
bus and was accosted by two officers standing in the cramped aisle
space were merely factors in considering whether a seizure had
occurred. 158 Similarly, valid consent to a police search does not turn
on the individual's knowledge that he or she had a right to refuse the
search, as one might expect. Rather, the constitutional validity of a
consent search depends upon whether the consent was "voluntary,"
which is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances: "While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one
factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish
such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent."159
158. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,435-37 (1991).
159. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973); see also Rodriguez, 497 U.S.
at 177, which involved a third party's authority to consent to the search of a suspecfs home.
Historically, the home is accorded the highest degree of protection under the Fourth
Amendment, and the Court has stated unequivocally that "[aibsent exigent circumstances, that
threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 590 (1980). Knowing this, one might have predicted that a warrantless police search of a
19981 369
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Depending on the context, Fourth Amendment reasonableness
analysis takes account of several criteria: the text of the amend-
ment;60 history;161 threats to police safety;162 the use of standardized
police procedures;163 subjective and objective expectations of privacy;64
the presence of police coercion; 65 the fact that privacy interests are
only marginally protected;166 the potential danger to the public at
large;167 the severity of the alleged criminal conduct a suspect has
committed;68 whether a suspect poses a threat to the community or
actively resists an officer's seizure; 69 and a whole host of other factors
home based solely on the consent of someone without authority to consent to the search was a
patent violation of the Fourth Amendment. But consistent with its "objective" model of the
Fourth Amendment, the modem Court has not opted for this bright-line approach. Instead,
Rodriguez held that even in cases where a third party lacks authority to consent to a search of
another's home, the question of consent must be judged under a totality of the circumstances
standard-do the facts available to the officer warrant a person of reasonable caution in the
belief that the third party had authority to consent to the search? See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at
185-88.
160. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176-77 (1984) (holding that the text of
the Fourth Amendment does not extend to the "open fields" of private property).
161. See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-36 (1995) (relying on history of com-
mon law to find that the "knock and announce" rule forms part of the reasonableness inquiry of
the Fourth Amendment); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380 (1993) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (noting that one of the purposes of the Fourth Amendment is to "preserve that degree of
respect for the privacy of persons and the inviolability of their property that existed" in 1791);
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 26 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the judiciary
should be reluctant to invalidate "a police practice that was accepted at the time of the adoption
of the Bill of Rights and has continued to receive the support of many state legislatures").
162. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968) (stating that "it would be unreasonable to
require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties").
163. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (stating that adherence to
police procedures was indicative of a reasonable inventory search of the defendant's automo-
bile).
164. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988) (stating that "[tihe warrant-
less search of garbage bags... would violate the Fourth Amendment only if respondents mani-
fested a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage that society accepts as objectively
reasonable"); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (holding that a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy must be subjectively reasonable to the defendant and objectively reasonable to
society).
165. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (holding that the
presence of coercion should be considered in assessing the validity of a consent search of the
suspect during a traffic stop).
166. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 596 (1991) (balancing the right to privacy
against the need for effective law enforcement); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1975)
(same).
167. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989) (stating
that "W[the Government's interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure
safety... presents 'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures
from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements").
168. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (stating that "the severity of the
crime at issue" goes to the reasonableness of a warantless stop); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S.
1, 11 (1985) (holding that an officer's use of deadly force may be constitutional where the fleeing
suspect is believed to have committed a crime involving "serious physical harm").
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depending on the circumstances. Under the current regime, any one
of these various considerations may influence the ultimate decision of
whether a challenged police intrusion is reasonable, but racial impact
may not. This is a curious way to formulate Fourth Amendment
rules. As Professor Randall Kennedy has perceptively recognized in
discussing the connection between race and suspicion of criminality,
not only is reasonableness a concept that defies easy description, it
can also disguise unspoken assumptions and fears about law
enforcement and the people enmeshed in confrontations with the
police. Professor Kennedy asserted that:
Reasonableness, then, is not a definite, arithmetic, objective quality that is
independent of aims and values. It is a concept that is considerably more
subtle, complex, malleable, and mysterious than the simplistic model of
decisionmaking relied upon by those who accept at face value the
"reasonableness" or "rationality" of conduct that expresses not only
controversial moral and political judgments, but also deep-seated, perhaps
unconscious, affections, fears, and aversions. 170
Because reasonableness is a malleable concept, the Court could easily
add consideration of racial impact to the current analysis without
requiring fundamental change of search and seizure standards. More
importantly, however, consideration of racial impact would enable the
Court to take account of the realities on the street, which include
police methods disproportionately employed against minority groups
and individuals.
Concerns about creating a Fourth Amendment "double stan-
dard" should not preclude consideration of racial impact. In certain
contexts, the police already utilize a de facto double standard, relying
on race, ethnicity, or socio-economic status of the neighborhood when
conducting searches and seizures. Where the police engage in (or are
perceived by minorities to have engaged in) such conduct, the ensuing
harm and tension within the minority community is palpable, even for
the police. 171 Judicial recognition and consideration of the adverse
169. See, e.g., Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (listing these factors as part of its inquiry into the
reasonableness of the investigatory stop).
170. KENNEDY, supra note 35, at 144-45.
171. See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar, Torture Case Puts Officers on Defensive More Skittish,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1997, at Al (describing the tension officers feel while on duty in minority
communities after alleged police brutality case: "TPeople don't look at cops as someone who
helps them,' said Joe Gueits, a housing police officer in the Bronx. 'They look at us like an
occupying force. This kind of thing makes that worse. You can tell by the way they look at you,
by their body language, by what they say.' ").
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racial impact that emerges from such police behavior will not harm
Fourth Amendment norms.
Instead, consideration of racial impact will sharpen judicial
review because judges will have to pay attention to the effects of po-
lice behavior on all racial groups. 172 In other words, judicial assess-
ment of racial impact need not produce differing Fourth Amendment
rules for individuals depending upon their racial or ethnic back-
ground. Thus, when white motorists are targeted under the guise of
pretextual traffic stops, their Fourth Amendment rights have also
been violated. Sensitivity to the harm caused by racial targeting by
the police will expand the Fourth Amendment interests of all citi-
zens.173
Finally, consideration of racial impact will advance Fourth
Amendment values by focusing judicial attention on the arbitrary
application of police authority. Despite the connection of arbitrary
police conduct to the history of the Amendment, controlling police
discretionary power is not the central focus of the modern Court's
Fourth Amendment doctrine. Instead, the Court appears to focus on
whether a challenged police intrusion is rational from a police
172. See Robert Tomsho, Matter of Principle: High School in El Paso Gives the Border
Patrol A Civil Rights Lesson, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1993, at Al (describing a federal judge's
granting of a temporary restraining order after hearing evidence that border patrol was harass-
ing Hispanic high school students with unreasonable searches and seizures). For a more
detailed report on alleged law enforcement misconduct against Hispanic individuals in
Southwestern border communities, see FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE
SOUTHWEST: CIVIL RIGHTS IMPACTS ON BORDER CoMMUtNmEs 81 (1997) (summarizing allega-
tions of misconduct by the Border Patrol, including "shootings, beatings, and sexual assault;
racial and ethnic insults; rude and abusive language; threats and coercion; illegal or inappropri-
ate searches, seizures, and arrests; and confiscation of documents").
173. A few years ago, the Clinton Administration proposed that tenants in the nation's
public housing projects be encouraged to sign "consent clauses" that would allow unannounced,
random sweeps of their apartments. Although many black public housing residents applauded
the Administration's action, a few individuals voiced concern that the proposed "consent
clauses" might be a mandatory condition of leases given primarily to poor minority persons with
no place else to go for housing choices. See Tracey Maclin, Public Housing Searches Ignore the
Constitution, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, May 24, 1994, at 19.
Not surprisingly, white suburban homeowners are just as concerned about open-ended
invitations to police entry as are poor black residents who live in public housing units. A few
months after the Administration's proposal, a police chief in a predominately white New Jersey
suburb learned that homeowners in his town thought little of his plan of asking parents of
teenagers to waive their Fourth Amendment rights and allow police to enter their homes to
discover alcohol-drinking teenagers. See Robert Hanley, An Anti-Drinking Campaign, and How
It Flopped, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1994, at B1 (describing that after sending out approximately
2,700 consent forms to homes with teenagers, only 20 forms were returned after four months;
Police Chief Louis J. Mader stated, " T d have liked a better response.' ").
372
1998] RACE AND THE FOURTHAMENDMENT 373
perspective. 174  Yet, in certain contexts, search and seizure law
remains concerned with the discretionary powers of police officers. 175
Discretionary police authority may generate discriminatory
searches and seizures and tension between the police and minority
individuals. 76 Even where there is no proof that the police are acting
with a specific racial intent, a police intrusion may violate Fourth
Amendment norms due to its arbitrary nature. An intrusion can be
"arbitrary" even where there is a facial justification for its initiation if
it is "conducted at the discretion of [police] officials, who may act
despotically and capriciously in the exercise of the power to search
and seizure."' 77 Under this view, a pretextual traffic stop of a black
motorist is a paradigmatic arbitrary seizure. Probable cause of a
traffic offense does not negate the arbitrariness of the seizure because
the seizure is effectuated for purposes other than traffic enforcement.
The officer conducts the seizure because he unreasonably believes
that there is a greater chance of finding criminal evidence in the vehi-
cle of a black motorist. While officers may hold these views or are
trained to think in this manner, there is no empirical data that
supports the claim that police are more likely to find contraband or
other criminal evidence in the vehicles of black motorists stopped for
traffic violations. 78 Rather, judges are left only with the bald
174. See Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 197, 236-39 (1993).
175. See, e.g., Michigan State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454-58 (1989); Marshall v.
Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 529 (1967).
176. See Respondent's Brief at App. 9A, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (No. 77-
1571) ("The conclusion reached by all of the relevant literature [discussing discretionary power
of police officers], in short, is that police officers' behavior will reflect their biases when the
officers are given free rein."); SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM 32 (1993) (noting the
validity of the claim that an unregulated deadly force policy "allows officers to act out their
racial stereotypes: that the black man lurking in the shadows is inherently dangerous, whereas
the white suspect is not. Restrictive shooting policies, although nominally addressed to race-
neutral situations, curb the effect of racial stereotypes, with rather dramatic results." Because
of restrictions on officer discretion, "[flewer people are being shot and killed, racial disparities in
shooting have been reduced, and police officers are in no greater danger."); Schwartz, supra note
35, at 351-54 (describing empirical studies indicating that unrestrictive deadly force policies
lead to greater numbers of blacks being shot and killed); see also REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTS
CoMMIrrEE ON Crvm RiGHTS: To SECURE THESE RIGHTS 25 (1947) ("[W]herever unfettered
police lawlessness exists, civil rights may be vulnerable to the prejudices of the region or of
dominant local groups, and to the caprice of individual policemen. Unpopular, weak, or
defenseless groups are most apt to suffer."), quoted in Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae at 4 n.5, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Nos. 63, 74 &
67).
177. Amsterdam, supra note 123, at 411.
178. For example, the data produced by the Maryland State Police reveals no differences in
the success rate of troopers when searching black and white motorists stopped for traffic
offenses. Cf. Hecker, supra note 43, at 569 (noting that the disparate impact on black motorists
from traffic stops "may be justified if, in fact, race is probative of drug activity or correlates with
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assertions from the police that when blacks are involved, "'there is
always a greater chance of something wrong.'"17s
While Terry signaled that the adverse racial impact from police
intrusions was a legitimate concern of the Fourth Amendment,
Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte endorsed an officer's reliance on
race, in certain contexts, when deciding whether to effectuate a sei-
zure. More specifically, Martinez-Fuerte sanctioned discretionary
seizures of motorists even where there was reason to believe that race
was a motivating, if not determinative, factor for the seizure.
Reliance on race was constitutionally acceptable, because "that reli-
ance clearly is relevant to the law enforcement need to be served."180
One need not applaud the results in Brignoni-Ponce and
Martinez-Fuerte to recognize that these rulings support the submis-
sion of race-based arguments to attack the validity of pretextual traf-
fic stops. Both cases recognize that in certain contexts, race is a cru-
cial component in police decisionmaking. Both cases also recognize
the relevance of race in the adjudication of Fourth Amendment issues.
Moreover, Martinez-Fuerte established the Court's willingness to
allow statistical evidence to influence the resolution of Fourth
Amendment issues related to race. The Court cited government-sup-
plied statistics to show that border agents were not relying exclu-
sively on ethnicity in making selective referrals, and that the use of
ethnicity by border agents to make selective referrals promoted the
law enforcement interest at hand. 8'
The Court's Fourth Amendment logic should not be unidirec-
tional. If the Court permits the government to offer statistical
evidence to prove that its officers are not exclusively relying on race or
ethnicity in exercising their discretionary authority, then the Court
should allow black defendants to submit statistical evidence indicat-
ing otherwise. Similarly, if the government offers statistical evidence
to sustain its assertion that race or ethnic-based decisionmaking
"clearly is relevant" to law enforcement interests, 2 then black
defendants should be given the opportunity to submit statistical
evidence indicating that race-based decisionmaking does not promote
the law enforcement goal served by a particular intrusion. In sum,
race-neutral factors that are probative of drug activity," but finding it "unlikely that the vast
disparity found in the [Volusia County] Florida and Maryland studies in particular can be
explained in this fashion. It seems more likely that police employ racial stereotypes that too
often view black drivers, in particular, with suspicion.").
179. BROWN, supra note 46, at 170.
180. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 564 n.17 (1976).
181. See id. at 564 n.16.
182. See id. at 564 n.17.
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just as Brignoni-Ponce ruled that ethnic considerations are relevant
in determining the reasonableness of a seizure and Martinez-Fuerte
allowed statistical data on ethnicity and police decisionmaking to
influence its determination of the reasonableness of discretionary
race-based seizures, the Court should give black defendants the
chance to prove that racial targeting of motorists for traffic seizures is
unreasonable.
As a doctrinal matter, the core of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness, and reasonableness "is measured in objective terms
by examining the totality of the circumstances." 18 An objective
consideration of any law enforcement program should include
accurate information about how the law is enforced. Fourth
Amendment "reasonableness" should not be defined in a vacuum, or
in a way that ignores the realities visited upon black and other
minority citizens. 18 Where accurate information indicates that black
motorists are being detained for traffic violations in a
disproportionate manner, or in brazen violation of public regulations,
and the state provides no neutral explanation other than the fact that
a traffic offense has been observed, a judicial rebuke of these police
procedures is essential. Otherwise, the value of the Fourth
Amendment will be meaningless for a substantial segment of our
nation.
IV. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE FouRTH AMENDMENT
Putting aside the Court's prior cases acknowledging that race
matters in the adjudication of search and seizure law, Whren was
wrong to segregate racial concerns and Fourth Amendment values for
other reasons. The model of the Fourth Amendment envisioned by
the Whren Court provides only procedural protection for the
individual. Under Whren, the Amendment protects a motorist from
unwarranted discretionary seizures provided there is no probable
cause to believe that he has committed a traffic offense. Once
probable cause exists, Fourth Amendment protection terminates and
the police are free to conduct a seizure at their whim.
This constitutional interpretation is wrong because it overlooks
that the Fourth Amendment provides substantive, as well as proce-
183. Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417,421(1996).
184. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(observing that the Fourth Amendment protects "Everyman").
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dural, protection. In the context of traffic stops, the substantive pro-
tection afforded by the Amendment requires the judiciary to consider
the real world of law enforcement and to reconcile that reality with a
meaningful right to be free from unreasonable seizures. When viewed
this way, the analysis of Whren is more than "quite disappointing."18
The opinion is spurious because it disregards, or at best is indifferent
to, police discretion, police perjury, and the mutual distrust between
blacks and the police-issues intertwined with the enforcement of
traffic stops.
A. Police Discretionary Power
The constitutional liberty of motorists to drive the nation's
highways cannot be confined to the procedural right announced in
Whren. Under Whren, if the police have probable cause that any mo-
torist has committed a traffic offense, a routine traffic stop is per se
permissible under the Fourth Amendment. This interpretation, one
could argue, is not only consistent with constitutional text and
history, but highly pragmatic because it eases the burden of judges
faced with claims of pretextual behavior.18 6 This reasoning, however,
ignores the substantial discretion officers possess in deciding which
vehicles to stop for the myriad of traffic offenses they observe daily.8 7
185. LAFAVE, supra note 43, § 1.4, at 13.
186. See Harris, supra note 19, at 553, noting that Whren's reasoning
is not entirely wrong. There is no question that it will be easier for lower courts to work
with the "could have" than the "would have" rule. The "could have" rule requires very
little evidence; the officer need only testify that she observed a traffic violation and
stopped the car. The court will either believe the testimony or reject it.
Id.
187. Id. at 559 ("[Wlith the traffic code in hand, any officer can stop any driver any time.");
see also Bill Torpy & Diane Loupe, 'It's a Stab in the Dark', ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 9, 1992,
at BI (noting comments of an officer that the more cars you stop and search, the more drugs will
be found; another officer testified that he routinely asks for consent to search during traffic
stops and searched at least 80% of the cars he stopped, but that he has stopped "hundreds" of
vehicles where no drugs were found).
Although the overwhelming majority of these pretextual stops do not yield narcotics or other
contraband, some officers are unmoved by criticism of their conduct and believe their seizures of
innocent motorists are proper. See Mary Callahan, CHP Under Fire For Traffic Stops In Drug
Fight Officials Deny North Coast Action Violates Rights, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, Cal.),
Nov. 25, 1996, at Al (quoting officer who feels that pretextual traffic stops are valid, "'I look at
it this way, and I tell people, you know, there's a lot of drugs in this country, and I almost look
at it as their little part in the war against drugs' "); Greg Garland, 1-10 Drug Searches; Seizure
Law Critics Point To Sulphur Police Tactics, THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, Louisiana), Feb. 9,
1997, at 1A (responding to the criticism that his highway drug interdiction team is successful in
only one out of every 33 searches, Sulphur Police Captain Keith Andrus stated: "It's just like
when you have a war, you're going to have some friendly fire.... Is it worth inconveniencing a
few people or would you rather have your community ruined by drugs?").
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The Court, however, responds that probable cause of a traffic
violation sufficiently checks police discretion.'8 This answer is iu-
sory. Probable cause of a traffic offense not only fails to diminish the
discretion possessed by officers, but may actually facilitate arbitrary
seizures. If 98.1% of the drivers on a section of the New Jersey
Turnpike are committing a traffic offense, and 15% percent of those
violators are black motorists, but 46% of the stops by state troopers on
that section of the Turnpike are of black motorists 89 and there is not a
race-neutral explanation for the disparity, then probable cause is not
acting as a check on police discretion.
If 93.3% of the drivers on a portion of Interstate 95 in
Maryland are violating the traffic laws, and only 17.5% of those viola-
tors are black motorists, but 72.9% of the vehicles stopped and
searched by state troopers are driven by black motorists' 90 and the
head of the state police defends this disparity by noting that traffic
stops are made on a case-by-case judgment based on "intelligence
information" that he will not reveal to the public, 191 then probable
cause is not acting as a check on police discretion. Similarly, if black
men account for 45% of the traffic citations issued by a special drug
patrol in western North Carolina that uses traffic stops as a means to
interdict narcotics, but black men received only 24.2% of the traffic
citations issued by other officers patrolling the same highways, 92 and
the commander of the special drug patrol cannot provide a race-
neutral explanation for the disparity of black men stopped by the
special patrol, 19 then probable cause is not acting as a check on police
discretion. Faced with this evidence, it is easy to see that when police
target minority motorists for pretextual traffic stops, probable cause
is an insufficient check against unreasonable seizures. Rather than
protect motorists, in this context, probable cause acts as a lever to
initiate an arbitrary seizure, and then insulates the decision from
judicial review.94
188. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1773-74 (1996).
189. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
191. All Things Considered: ACLU Says Maryland State Police Stop Too Many Blacks
(National Public Radio, May 7, 1997).
192. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
193. See Neff& Stith, supra note 2, at Al.
194. Professor LaFave makes a similar point when he notes that the essential element in
Whren "is that probable cause as to a minor traffic violation can be so easily come by that its
existence provides no general assurance against arbitrary police action." LAFAVE, supra note
43, § 1.4, at 6.
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Whren's "procedural" model of the Fourth Amendment does not
curtail the enormous discretion officers possess in deciding which
motorists to stop. And the Court's sarcastic response to this logic only
adds insult to the constitutional injury suffered by black and Hispanic
motorists:
[WMe are aware of no principle that would allow us to decide at what point a
code of law becomes so expansive and so commonly violated that infraction
itself can no longer be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness of enforcement.
And even if we could identify such exorbitant codes, we do not know by what
standard (or what right) we would decide... which particular provisions are
sufficiently important to merit enforcement. 195
As the Court well knows, the complaint of black motorists is
not the expansiveness of the traffic code itself, but the arbitrary and
discriminatory seizures effectuated under the code by police. Nor is
there an absence of legal "principle" to handle this symptom of discre-
tionary and arbitrary power. The principle of preventing discretion-
ary enforcement of the law has been asserted in other constitutional
contexts and fits nicely with the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to
check police power. Justice Robert Jackson explained why the judici-
ary must remain alert to official abuses under the guise of discretion-
ary authority:
[Niothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow
[government] officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply
legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited
upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better measure
to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in
operation. 96
Justice Jackson's logic also extends to the power of police offi-
cers who enforce the traffic laws. The problem in Whren and other
pretextual stop cases is not deciding "at what point a code of law
becomes so expansive and so commonly violated that infraction itself
can no longer be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness of enforce-
ment."197 Rather, the problem is deciding whether officers jeopardize
Fourth Amendment norms when they conduct seizures under a traffic
code in a manner that brazenly deviates from normal procedures or
wildly defies statistical expectations. As Professor Davis has already
195. Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1777 (1996).
196. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
197. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1777.
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noted, the police can execute arbitrary seizures even under an other-
wise reasonable and neutral law: "If the police enforce a statute
against one out of a hundred known violators, and no one can know in
advance which one will be selected or why, does not the system of
enforcement encourage arbitrariness and discrimination, and is it not
therefore unconstitutional?" 198 Finally, the Court will not have to
search in vain to determine which provisions of the traffic code are
"sufficiently important to merit enforcement." 199  Where police
discretion produces arbitrary seizures under a facially valid provision,
the solution is not to invalidate the particular provision of the code,
but to nullify the police conduct itself.20
B. Police Perjury
The discretionary power of officers to effectuate arbitrary
seizures under the traffic laws is just one tool available to police to
deny black and Hispanic motorists their substantive rights under the
Fourth Amendment. Police often commit peijury to achieve the same
end. While the practice of police peijury may not be as old as police
targeting of blacks for disproportionate search and seizure, it often
works hand in glove with police intrusions that have a disparate im-
pact on minority persons.201
The Mollen Commission, impaneled to study police corruption
in New York City, has documented the linkage between police peijury
198. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TEx L. REV. 703,
714 (1974); see also Hecker, supra note 43, at 555-57.
199. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1777.
200. When confronted with evidence that some prosecutors were using their discretionary
power via the peremptory challenge to arbitrarily remove black jurors, the Court did not nullify
peremptory challenges entirely, but required prosecutors to provide race-neutral explanations
where defendants show a prima facie case of discrimination. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 93-94 (1986). Under the Batson framework, a defendant can establish a prima facie case by
showing that the totality of the relevant facts raises an inference of purposeful discrimination.
Once a prima facie case is shown, the burden shifts to the state to rebut that case. "The State
cannot meet this burden on mere general assertions that its officials did not discriminate or that
they properly performed their official duties." Id. at 94. Rather, the prosecutor must provide
race-neutral reasons for his selection criteria. A similar model could be employed where a black
motorist can raise an inference of discrimination either through statistical data that indicate
race-based traffic stops or the type of brazen violation of internal police regulations that oc-
curred in Whren.
201. See PAUL CHEviGNY, POLICE POWER 277 (1969) (finding that police lying or "distortion
of fact is the thread [that] runs through all abuses, however different they may seem").
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and police misconduct.202  The Commission did not mince words in
describing the extent of police perjury it found:
As with other forms of corruption, it is impossible to gauge the full extent of
police falsifications. Our investigation indicated, however, that this is
probably the most common form of police corruption facing the criminal justice
system, particularly in connection with arrests for possession of narcotics and
guns. Several officers also told us that the practice of police falsification in
connection with such arrests is so common in certain precincts that it has
spawned its own word: "testi[l]ying."20 3
The Commission described the typical forms of perjury, the
motivations for it, and the failure to stop it by supervisory and prose-
cutorial officials in blunt terms:
When the stop or search [of a vehicle] was unlawful, officers falsified their
statements about the arrest to cover for the unlawful acts. Fabricating a
traffic violation or claiming to see contraband in plain view was a commonly
used pretext-which was virtually never questioned by supervisory officers. In
one score from a car, for example, the records indicate that the officers
fabricated a story for the District Attorney's Office about a car running a red
light, and that they then observed the butt of a gun in plain view.204
The Commision continued:
What breeds this tolerance is a deep-rooted perception among many officers of
all ranks within the Department that nothing is really wrong with
compromising facts to fight crime in the real world.... As one dedicated
officer put it, police officers often view falsification as, to use his words, "doing
God's work"-doing whatever it takes to get a suspected criminal off the
streets. This attitude is so entrenched, especially in high-crime precincts, that
when investigators confronted one recently arrested officer with evidence of
perjury, he asked in disbelief, "WhaVs wrong with that? They're guilty."
202. THE CITY OF NEW YORK COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE
CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF TiE POLICE DEPARTMENT, COMMISSION
REPORT, July 7, 1994 [hereinafter Mollen Commission].
203. Id. at 36.
204. Id. at 29-30. The Commission further noted:
Officers also commit falsification to serve what they perceive to be "legitimate" law
enforcement ends-and for ends that.., officers alike stubbornly defend as correct. In
their view, regardless of the legality of the arrest, the defendant is in fact guilty and
ought to be arrested. Officers reported a litany of manufactured tales.... We found
that such motivations to falsify are often present in narcotics enforcement units,
especially to justify unlawful searches and arrests .... Regardless of the motives
behind police falsifications, what is particularly troublesome about this practice is that it
is widely tolerated by corrupt and honest officers alike, as well as their supervisors.
Corrupt and honest officers told us that their supervisors knew or should have known
about falsified versions of searches and arrests and never questioned them.
Id. at 38-40.
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[Sleveral former and current prosecutors acknowledged---"off the re-
cord"-that perjury and falsifications are serious problems in law enforcement
that, though not condoned, are ignored. The form this tolerance takes,
however, is subtle which makes accountability in this area especially
difficult .... [A] story that sounds suspicious to the trained ear; patterns of
coincidences that are possible, but highly unlikely; inconsistencies that could
be explained, but sound doubtful. In short, the tolerance the criminal justice
system exhibits takes the form of a lesser level of scrutiny when it comes to
police officers' testimony. Fewer questions are asked; weaker explanations are
accepted. 20s
One need not accept that perjury is a pervasive problem in
every police department to recognize that perjury (or the potential for
perjury) may play a central role in how pretextual traffic stops are
carried out. When narcotics officers and their supervisors admit to
stopping as many cars as possible under the guise of traffic stops to
investigate drug trafficking,206 the possibilities and temptation to lie
about a motorist's driving skills are manifest. When patrol officers
know that higher-ranking officers tolerate and sometimes encourage
targeting minority motorists, 207 but frown upon the practice when
publicly disclosed, the incentive for the police to falsely claim that a
black motorist was not wearing his seatbelt or failed to signal a turn
is substantial. When subjective traffic violations-like driving
unreasonably slowly or not paying full attention to driving-can be
falsely lodged against a motorist and the officer knows that his
testimony is unlikely to be contradicted by a neutral source, the
chances for perjury increase. Finally, when actual police perjury is
captured on film, showing a Louisiana officer stopping a motorist for
"improper lane change," and research shows that this officer has
issued hundreds of other traffic tickets for the same violation and
minority drivers are the overwhelming targets of these traffic stops,os
then police perjury is no longer an isolated phenomenon, but part and
205. Id. at 41-42.
206. See Roy & Curtis, supra note 91, at Al; Bill Torpy & Diane Loupe, Cherokee County
Drug Searches Called Racially Biased Traffic Stops: Critics Say Minorities Are Unfairly Singled
Out, But Deputies Defend The Tactics, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 9, 1992, at B1 (quoting
Lieutenant Vic West, the commander of the Bartow County, Georgia, Sheriffs Department's
drug unit, "Obviously, iWs a stab in the dark; if you search enough cars, you'll catch a few.").
207. See German, supra note 47, at Al (discussing report written by township attorney
which states that a supervising sergeant in the Avon, Connecticut, Police Department conceded
that he directed his officers to find reasons to stop vehicles driven by minority motorists);
German, supra note 51, at Al (reporting that two Avon officers and two former officers support
claim that high-ranking officers have encouraged patrol officers to target minority drivers; these
officers say that "as many as 10 of the departments 30 members are known to follow that
practice").
208. See Dateline, supra note 55.
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parcel of the process used to deny black motorists their substantive
rights under the Fourth Amendment.20 9
Despite these realities, the Court rarely, if ever, considers
police perjury when resolving Fourth Amendment cases.210 Evidently,
the Court believes that police perjury (or the potential for perjury) is
not a problem and has no bearing on the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.
This type of thinking is misplaced for several reasons.211 To
begin with, officers do routinely lie about searches and seizures.212
209. The Christopher Commission, which undertook a massive study of the Los Angeles
Police Department after the Rodney King beating, found that black and Hispanic drivers in Los
Angeles were targeted for unjustified traffic stops:
Many witnesses complained of the apparent practice by the police of stopping
individuals because they resemble a generalized description of a suspect or because they
appear not to belong in a particular neighborhood. The Commission repeatedly heard
accounts of African-American and Latino males, often in expensive or late model cars, or
in parts of the City where they might be considered out of place, being stopped for no
apparent reason or for one that appears on the surface to be a pretext. The existence of
this practice among some LAPD officers was acknowledged by an LAPD senior
command officer in testimony before the Commission....
Routine stops of young African-American and Latino males, seemingly without
"probable cause" or "reasonable suspicion," may be part and parcel of the LAPD's
aggressive style of policing... Incidents were reported of African-American [off-duty]
officers being stopped by white officers in circumstances not resulting in an arrest or
otherwise involving any apparent infraction or illegal activity by the African-American
officers.
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, July 9,
1991, 76-77 [hereinafter Christopher Commission].
210. But see James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 321 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(recognizing the potential for police perjury); Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165 (1978)
(recognizing the potential for false statements).
211. Professor Cloud has explained why judges have erroneously relied upon the Court's
objective Fourth Amendment analysis to reject incorporating concerns about police perjury into
their Fourth Amendment decision-making processes:
First, it fails to recognize that an officer's perjury about some aspect of an investigation
may raise questions concerning the veracity of his testimony about the facts creating
reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Second, it abandons the educational functions
of constitutional law.... One appropriate function of judicial review in Fourth
Amendment cases is to teach poli~e officers what the Constitution permits and what it
forbids, and how to conform their conduct to these requirements.
Cloud, supra note 43, at 1367 n.127.
212. Many scholars and observers of the criminal justice system have acknowledged the
widespread problem of police perjury connected with Fourth Amendment cases. See ALAN M.
DERSHOWITZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS 49-64 (1996) (describing police perjury as common); H.
RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL 115-116 (1988) (asserting that police regard perjury "as the
natural and inevitable outgrowth of artificial and unrealistic post facto judgments that release
criminals"); Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311, 1315 (1994) ("Police
perjury occurs most frequently when officers are testifying about searches and seizures and
witness interrogations. Police perjury about these topics is often the product of rules imposing
penalties for illegal police practices, and the most important rules are those requiring the
exclusion of evidence discovered by unconstitutional means."); Dripps, supra note 39, at 698-703
(noting that police perjury is common and that perjury in Fourth Amendment cases "can
function as a shock-absorber, making sure that the exclusionary rule does not cost the
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The Court's refusal to acknowledge police perjury (or the potential for
perjury) in a case like Whren is particularly unfortunate since
"motivations to falsify are often present in narcotics enforcement
units, especially to justify unlawful searches or arrests."213 Second,
successful police perjury "can defeat any constitutional rule."214 By
deciding Fourth Amendment cases without accounting for the
potential for police perjury, judges appear naive and Fourth
Amendment rules take on a "make-believe" quality to the police and
the public. In the end, because police can lie without fear of the
consequences and the public is aware of this fact, nobody will take the
Fourth Amendment seriously.
Furthermore, police perjury is often difficult to detect at first
glance. Trial judges must "decide cases one at a time, so the police
almost always win the swearing contest"215 between officer and defen-
dant. Police perjury becomes evident when "one stands back from the
particular case and looks at a series of cases. It then becomes appar-
ent that policemen are committing perjury at least in some of them,
and perhaps in nearly all of them."216 When the difficulty of proving
police falsehoods in a particular case is combined with the strong
incentives influencing a trial judge to accept the police version of the
facts,217 the chances of a trial judge dismissing a case or suppressing
evidence because of police perjury are remote. Because of these prob-
lems and incentives confronting trial judges, appellate courts are
more likely to discern police perjury and are better positioned to
construct Fourth Amendment standards that account for the possibil-
ity or likelihood of police perjury in the future. Nevertheless,
appellate courts rarely discuss police perjury when adjudicating
Fourth Amendment cases.218
convictions of especially heinous criminals"); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury and the
Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75,
94-114 (1992) (discussing the existence and the types of police perjury); Christopher Slobogin,
Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1037, 1044-45 (1996)
(arguing that police commit perjury in search and seizure cases because, among other reasons,
they think they can get away with it); Irving Younger, The Perjury Routine, NATION, May 8,
1967, 596, 596-97; Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An
Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 1016, 1049-51 (1987)
(describing officers conceding the existence of police perjury).
213. Mollen Commission, supra note 202, at 38.
214. Dripps, supra note 39, at 693.
215. Id.
216. Younger, supra note 212, at 596; see also Cloud, supra note 212, at 1318 ("It is the
repetition of th[e] suspicious story in case after case that suggests fabrication.").
217. See Cloud, supra note 212, at 1321-24; Slobogin, supra note 212, at 1047.
218. Cf. Cloud, supra note 43, at 1367 n.127 (citing United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210,
215 (3d Cir. 1987), where the court stated that the exclusionary rule was intended to "deter
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These realities suggest that police perjury is a legitimate (but
neglected) concern of judges in the adjudication of Fourth Amendment
cases. But there is an additional reason why police perjury should be
a factor in a case like Whren. When officers target minority motorists
for traffic stops to initiate unwarrated narcotics investigations, falsifi-
cation is more easily committed by the police and accepted by judges.
When the discovery of narcotics is the goal, the catalysts for police
perjury increase:
[F]alsifications are most prevalent in high-crime precincts [in New York City]
where opportunities for narcotics and gun arrests abound. In such precincts,
the prevalence of open criminal activity is high and the utility of an illegal
search or arrest is perceived as great. Officers - often correctly - believe that if
they search a particular person, or enter an apartment without a warrant, they
will find drugs or guns. Frustrated by what they perceive to be unrealistic
rules of law and by their own inability to stem the crime in their precincts
through legal means, officers take the law into their own hands. And police
falsification is the result.219
New York City is not the only place where police perjury and
falsehoods facilitated illegal searches and seizures. In Philadelphia,
operating under the pretense of a war on drugs, individual police
officers flagrantly violated the rights of black residents and lied about
their actions without fear of retribution.2 20 "[A] handful of officers
conducted a virtual reign of terror in poor black neighborhoods for
years, stopping suspects at will, stealing money, searching homes
with phony warrants, and sometimes even planting drugs" on inno-
cent persons. 221 As one elderly resident of North Philadelphia put it:
"Man, this stuff has been going on for years in North Philadelphia.... I can
remember it all the way into the Sixties. Cops stop anybody they want, do
unconstitutional conduct, not perjury. In the absence of a constitutional violation, there is no
basis upon which to exclude relevant evidence."). Professor Cloud properly notes that the
reasoning of cases like Hawkins is misplaced because it "erroneously consider[s] the questions of
police perjury and the reasons for a search and seizure to be unrelated." Cloud, supra note 43,
at 1367 n.127.
219. Mollen Commission, supra note 202, at 38.
220. See Mark Bowden & Mark Fazlollah, Lying Officer Never Counted on FBI; Officer
John Baird Had Beaten 22 Complaints. Then Came 23. And The Federal Agents, Who Had
Been Waiting and Watching His Scheming Ways, PHIADELPHIA INQUIRER, Sept. 12, 1995, at Al;
Mark Bowden & Mark Fazlollah, Officer Rode Roughshod, Got Away With It, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Sept. 11, 1995, at Al; Mark Bowden & Mark Fazlollah, With '91 Case, Scandal
Unfolded The Student Told of Torment at the Hands of The Two 39th District Police Officers.
Investigators: Findings Were the Tip of a Corruption Iceberg, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Sept. 10,
1995, at Al [hereinafter Corruption Iceberg].
221. Thomas J. Gibbons, Jr., et al., Police Corruption Inquiry Widens Up to 9 Officers in
Elite Unit Implicated, PHILADELPHIA INQUMER, Aug. 13, 1995, at Al.
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whatever they want, whenever they want. They beat people up and lock
people up. It they don't have evidence, they make up evidence. And when you
go to court, who the judge and jury going to believe? Some nigger or the
policeman?"
222
The same police perspectives and law enforcement interests
that induce police peijury in the high-crime neighborhoods of New
York and Philadelphia also exist on the highways patrolled by officers
responsible for interdicting illegal drugs. Many officers see nothing
wrong with targeting innocent minority drivers for traffic stops to
intercept narcotics because they believe (or are told) that blacks and
Hispanics dominate narcotics trafficking and other criminal con-
duct.223 Officers also believe that if they stop and search enough cars
they will eventually find drugs. Finally, from a police perspective, the
benefit of catching a guilty person justifies the peijury. An officer
may falsely assert that she saw drugs in plain view, or add a fact to
create probable cause or to validate a consent search-particularly
where she perceives that the judiciary has imposed unrealistic
barriers to the efforts to snare drug traffickers.224
222. Corruption Iceberg, supra note 220, at Al.
223. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 19, at 565 (quoting a Criminal Intelligence Report of the
Maryland State Police that instructed troopers to watch for "dealers and couriers (traffickers)
[who] are predominately black males and females... utilizing Interstate 68"); Roy & Curtis,
supra note 91, at Al (quoting Captain Ernie Scott, the commander of Orange County's narcotics
unit on why narcotics officers are more likely to search black motorists: "We don't control drug
routes and demographics. I think black mules (hired drug carriers) and black smugglers are
represented higher (on the turnpike) than they would be on other highways in the nation.");
Tracie Reddick, Routine Stops Called Stereoptyping, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Aug. 18, 1997, at
Florida/Metro 1 (describing a black officer admitting that he has allowed stereotypes that black
males are criminals to affect his police work); Louise Taylor, Video Shows Police How to Profile,
SUN HERALD (Bilox), Dec. 3, 1989, at Al (describing a videotape of the Louisiana State Police
that teaches officers how to catch drug couriers on highways where "Video describes the
[courier] as a Latin American man between 20 and 36 years old."); Torpy & Loupe, supra note
206, at BI (quoting Deputy Sheriff Jeff Shields: "'They say we pull over and arrest more
blacks.... Well, studies show black people traffic more drugs.' "). Stereotypes of blacks and
Hispanics are not confined to police officers. In discussing highway drug couriers, Mississippi
Justice Court Judge Vernon Ladner, was quoted as saying- "'If I was a policeman and I saw a
Hispanic on the interstate, rd think they were hauling dope.'" Taylor, supra note 18, at A15.
224. See UVILLER, supra note 212, at 115-16 (concluding that after spending a sabbatical
riding around with New York City officers, that the most common form of police perjury is "the
instrumental adjustment. A slight alteration in the facts to accommodate an unwieldy
constitutional constraint and obtain a just result.").
Interestingly, even when a traffic stop and police search reveals no narcotics, officers are
sometimes reluctant to accept the motorist's innocence. See Michael Janofsky, In Drug Fight,
Police Now Take to the Highway, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1995, at 1.12 (describing how after 30
minute search of a black motorist's vehicle for drugs disclosed no narcotics, motorist left without
a hint of anger which struck officer as unusual; "[ilt would hardly surprise him, [the officer] said
as the couple pulled away, that whatever [the second officer] was looking for would be
somewhere inside the Pathfinder on its trip back to New Jersey"); Neff & Stith, supra note 2, at
Al (quoting Sgt. Timmy Lee Cardwell, who issued more than 60% of his traffic citations to black
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:333
All of this suggests that peijury (or the potential for perjury) is
a real problem with pretextual traffic stops, particularly when
minority motorists are involved. 25 At a minimum, judges should
incorporate the likelihood of perjury into their deliberations when
adjudicating Fourth Amendment claims in this context. Otherwise,
pretextual traffic stops will continue, immunized by an "objective"
analysis that leaves unnoticed and unaccountable the realities of the
street. This state of affairs is unfortunate because the "Fourth
Amendment operates most of the time not in the rarefied world of
legal theory, but in the gritty reality of the thousands of encounters
each day between citizens and the armed representatives of
government."226
C. Distrust and Pretextual Traffic Stops
A final aspect of police targeting minority motorists for pretex-
tual traffic stops merits judicial attention: the distrust and loathing
of the police engendered among some blacks by this practice. Blacks
correctly see pretextual traffic stops as another sign that police offi-
cers view blacks, particularly black males, as criminals who deserve
singular scrutiny and treatment as second-class citizens.227
men while on drug patrol, "You may have had 17 cars searched where drugs are only found one
time. But that's not to say that the person who didn't have it wasn't involved."). This police
contempt and suspicion of blacks mirrors the attitudes of some officers who harassed blacks a
generation ago. See ED CRAY, THE BIG BLuE LINE 185 (1967), quoting a retired Detroit police
officer's testimony to the United States Commission on Civil Rights:
I would estimate - and this I have heard in the station also - that if you would stop and
search 50 Negroes and you get one good arrest out of it that's a good percentage; it's a
good day's work. So, in my opinion, there are 49 Negroes whose rights have been
misused, and that goes on every day. That's just about the entire population of Detroit
over a period of time.
225. See Younger, supra note 212, at 597 (commenting that the Court in McCray v. Illinois,
386 U.S. 300 (1967), "should not so casually have rejected the idea of a constitutional presump-
tion that policemen commit perjury."); but cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 313 (1967)
("Nothing in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state court judge
in every [suppression hearing] to assume the arresting officers are committing perjury.").
Ironically, the McCray Court justified its decision to uphold the "informer's privilege," which
permits the prosecution to withhold at a suppression hearing the identity of an informant who
has provided the only evidence establishing probable cause to arrest a person, by noting that at
a suppression hearing "the accused seeks to avoid the truth." Id. at 307. The Court apparently
was not worried that police perjury also "avoid[s] the truth."
226. Cloud, supra note 43, at 1345.
227. See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 16 F.3d 109, 114 (6th Cir. 1994) (Keith, J., dissent-
ing) stating:
The majority's willful disregard of the flagrant discriminatory treatment [by a police
officer who testified that the motorists' race was a factor in his decision to make a traffic
stop] in this case endorses a system where one set of traffic regulations exist for African-
Americans.... For the same traffic infraction, a white motorist remains an unimpeded
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Selecting minority motorists for pretextual traffic stops is a
predictable phenomenon in American culture. When police officers
either believe or are taught that black and Hispanic motorists are the
"mules" who transport illegal narcotics across the nation's highways,
one naturally expects disproportionate stops of minority motorists.
This anticipation, however, does not remove the resulting insult and
harm. Indeed, these seizures provoke an attitude of distrust of the
police that was prevalent among blacks thirty years ago when the
Court sanctioned the practice of stop and frisk notwithstanding the ill
effects that the intrusion engendered among blacks.
In Terry, the amicus brief of the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund provided the Court with an argument which
depicted the realities that blacks confront during police encounters
and expressed a different perspective on stop and frisk tactics. 228
Emphasizing that the Court should not determine the issue of stop
and frisk in a manner oblivious to race, the brief pointed to "the
obvious, unhappy fact that the policeman today is the object of
widespread and intense hatred in our inner cities" because of
aggressive patrol practices used against blacks.229 The brief also
called attention to the different ways that blacks and the police
perceive each other. Blacks, more so than whites, had negative
opinions about police courtesy, performance, and honesty. Inner city
black males viewed officers as brutal and sadistic individuals.230
Similarly, according to the brief:
[Plolice attitudes toward working class Negro youths and young adults are
often based on the concept of the Negro as a savage, or animal, or some being
outside of the human species. Therefore, the police expect behavior from
Negroes in accordance with this concept.... Because of the police officer's
conception of the Negro male, he frequently feels that most Negroes are
dangerous and need to be dealt with as an enemy even in the absence of visible
criminal behavior.2 l
These "complementary attitudes result in a vicious circle of
behavior which serves to confirm the image which Negro males and
violator, whereas an African-American motorist automatically becomes a suspected felon
and menace to society. Such disparate treatment alienates and ostracizes African-
Americans, fortifying their badge of second-class citizenship.
228. Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae at
1, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Nos. 63, 74 & 67).
229. Id. at 60-61.
230. See id. at 64.
231. Id. (quoting Letter of the Director of the Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence).
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police officers hold of each other."32 Finally, the brief cautioned the
Court not to be swayed by "the familiar inflated claims for stop and
frisk as tools of law and order,"23 without also considering the conse-
quences engendered by the intrusion:
Whatever its conveniences and benefits to a narrow view of law-enforcement,
stop and frisk carries with it an intense danger of inciting destructive
community conflict. To arm the police with an inherently vague and
standardless power to detain and search, especially where that power cannot
effectively be regulated, contributes to the belief which many Negroes
undeniably have that police suspicion is mainly suspicion of them, and police
oppression their main lot in life.
23
Today, there are troubling parallels to the atmosphere that
existed when Terry was decided. Despite impressive reductions in the
crime rate in many urban areas, "[mlany blacks have come to see the
police as just another gang."235 From Los Angeles to Philadelphia,
blue-ribbon commissions, the press, and scholars continue to docu-
ment the immense distrust that minority groups feel towards the
police.236 In many places, minorities have good reason for their mis-
givings. 37 For example, New York City officials like to brag that they
have the nation's most professional and well-trained police force. The
force has been run by two black police commissioners in the last
232. Id.
233. Id. at 68.
234. Id. at 68-69. The arguments of the NAACP brief were bolstered by the findings and
recommendations of the Kerner Commission. The Commission urged that police administrators
pay closer attention to the attitudes of blacks toward police behavior. It noted:
The recommendations we have proposed are designed to insure proper police
conduct in minority areas. Yet there is another facet of the problem: Negro perceptions
of police misconduct. Even if those perceptions are exaggerated, they do exist....
Many police officials believe strongly that there are law enforcement gains from
[aggressive patrol] techniques [like stop and frisk]. However, these techniques also have
law enforcement liabilities. Their employment therefore should not be merely automatic
but the product of a deliberate balancing of pluses and minuses by command
personnel .... If the aggressive patrol clearly relates to the control of crime, the
residents of the ghetto are likely to endorse the practice. What may arouse hostility is
not the fact of aggressive patrol but its indiscriminate use so that it comes to be
regarded not as crime control but as a new method of racial harassment.
Kerner Commission, supra note 130, at 160-61.
235. David . Shipler, Living Under Suspicion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1997, at A33; see also
MacFarquhar, supra note 171, at Al.
236. See generally CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR. ETAL., BEYOND THE RODNEY KING STORY: AN
INVESTIGATION OF POLICE CONDUCT IN MINORITY COMMUNITIES (1995) [hereinafter NAACP
Investigation of Police Conduct].
237. See Bruce Shapiro, When Justice Kills, NATION, June 9, 1997, at 21; Buffy Spencer,
Camcorder Catches Police Incident, SUNDAY HAMPSHIRE REPUBLIcAN (Springfield, Mass.), Apr.
13, 1997, at Al (describing how a videotape captured police officer kicking a black man in the
head while being held on the ground by other officers). See generally NAACP Investigation of
Police Conduct, supra note 236.
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fifteen years, but deadly force, brutality, and abuse of power by
officers remains a problem in minority communities.2 38 The human
238. See, e.g., Dan Barry, Officer Charged With Brutalizing Man in Brooklyn Police Station,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 14, 1997, at Al (describing how a police officer was charged with shouting
racial slurs at black man and shoving the wooden handle of a toilet plunger into his rectum and
then into his mouth); David N. Dinkins, Giuliani Time: What the Mayor Must Do About Police
Brutality, VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 26, 1997, at 34; David M. Herszenhorn, Judge Assails but
Acquits Officer in Man's Choking Death in Bronx, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1996, at Al; Clifford
Krauss, Case Casts Wide Light On Abuse By Police, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1995, at 1.21; Clifford
Krauss & Adam Nossiter, Bronx Abuse Complaints Stir Crackdown on Police, N.Y. TIMES, May
2, 1995, at Al; Selwyn Raab, City's Police Brutality Report Card: Complaints Down, Needs
Improving, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1997, at 1.41 (quoting city attorney who defends officers in
brutality suits who says many officers feel invulnerable to punishment: "What makes them
feel they are above the law is the fact that so little has been done against rogue cops in so many
cases in the past. They feel the odds of getting caught are extremely small.' "); Joe Sexton,
Bronx Police Inquiry Depicts A Night Shift Out of Control, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1995, at 1.1;
Deborah Sontag & Dan Barry, Police Complaints Settled, Rarely Resolved, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,
1997, at Al (stating that New York City "routinely pays out tens of thousands of dollars to
people who say the police abused them, but the Police Department rarely formally investigates
their allegations, and the officers named in their lawsuits almost always continue working
without scrutiny or punishment.").
New York Times columnist Bob Herbert has written several articles outlining the impact of
police shootings and misconduct in New York's minority neighborhoods. See Bob Herbert, A
Brutal Epidemic, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 28, 1997, at A15 ("In many neighborhoods, ethnic minorities
are treated with the kind of routine disrespect and brutality that was the hallmark of the Old
South. Very few people in high places are concerned about this problem. Crime is going down
and that is all that seems to matter."); Bob Herbert, Crossing the Abyss, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
1996, at A15, stating-
According to one view, here were three cops who had to make a split-second decision in a
tense and dangerous encounter with a potentially violent criminal. Two of the officers
fired because they felt their lives were in jeopardy. According to the other view, here
were three white cops on duty in a neighborhood full of people for whom they have only
disdain. Two of the officers fired-and kept firing-not because they were provoked or
in any real danger, but because that is what white cops do to black men.
Id.; Bob Herbert, One More Police Victim, N.Y. TlMEs, Aug. 14, 1997, at A31 (describing attack
of black man by officers with toilet plunger and wondering whether public officials will stop
rampant police brutality); Bob Herbert, Out of Control, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1997, at A17 ("City
residents who are endangered by criminal behavior, like the illegal firing of weapons, should not
also have to worry about being shot by trigger-happy police officers, or falsely arrested simply
because they were in the vicinity of criminal activity."); Bob Herbert, Police Overkill, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 11, 1997, at A29 (reporting that slow investigations of police shootings by the
Manhattan District Attorney "inevitably will contribute to the disheartening feeling among
many law-abiding New Yorkers, especially in black and Latino neighborhoods, that the
guardians of the law are reluctant to move against possible police misconduct."); Bob Herbert,
Savagery Beyond Sense, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1996, at A37 (finding that police beating of a black
man arrested for driving with a suspended license resulted in permanent paralysis from the
chest down; "the charge was driving with a suspended license. This was not John Gotti the cops
had in custody. But then, Gotti would never have been treated like that."); Bob Herbert,
Sickness In the N.Y.P.D., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1996, at A39, stating-
The killings [by police officers] continue because no one has stepped forward to make it
clear to the sadists and the sociopaths and the raging, howling racists in the Police
Department that their murderous behavior will not be tolerated. Instead, the entire
political and criminal justice establishment has gone out of its way to send the opposite
message: Once you button up that uniform and strap on that sidearm you can brutalize
certain types of people with impunity.
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rights group Amnesty International recently released a report noting
that:
the most serious complaints [of police misconduct and brutality in New York
City] tended to be concentrated in high crime precincts and in precincts with
large minority populations. More than two-thirds of the victims in the cases
examined were African-American or Latino and most, though not all, of the
officers involved were white. Nearly all of the victims in the cases of deaths in
custody (including shootings) reviewed by Amnesty International were
members of racial minorities.2 9
Police contempt for minority citizens and its nexus to police
abuse, although hard to quantify empirically, remains a problem. Six
years ago, the Christopher Commission found, in the wake of the
Rodney King beating, significant evidence of police bias against
minority citizens. This conclusion was bolstered, in part, by a Los
Angeles Police Department survey of 960 officers noting "that
approximately one-quarter (24.5%) of 650 officers responding agreed
that 'racial bias (prejudice) on the part of officers toward minority
citizens currently exists and contributes to a negative interaction
between police and the community.' "20 More recently, criminologist
Robert E. Worden, after surveying the scholarship on the causes of
police brutality, noted that a suspect's race "has significant effects on
the use of force" by police officers. 241 According to Worden, the fact
that "officers are more likely to use even reasonable force against
blacks might suggest that officers are, on average, more likely to
adopt a punitive or coercive approach to black suspects than they are
to white suspects."242
Adopting a more cautious stance than Professor Worden, Dean
Hubert G. Locke finds that many empirical studies are ambiguous on
the connection between race and police misconduct.243 "[R]esearchers
do not know or cannot assert much, with empirical reliability, about
whether there are racial reasons for police behavior because other
Id.; Bob Herbert, Why Were They Shot?, N.Y. TIES, Feb. 28, 1997, at A35.
239. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: POLICE BRUTALITY AND
EXCEssIvE FORCE IN THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT §2.7 (1996).
240. Christopher Commission, supra note 209, at 69. The Commission also noted that
27.6% of the LAPD survey's respondents agreed that "an officer's prejudice toward the suspect's
race may lead to the use of excessive force. (15% expressed no opinion; 57.3% disagreed.)" id
241. Robert E. Worden, The Causes of Police Brutality: Theory and Evidence on Police Use
of Force, in POLICE VIOLENCE, supra note 36, at 37.
242. Id.
243. See Hubert G. Locke, The Color of Law and the Issue of Color: Race and the Abuse of
Police Power, in POLICE VIOLENCE, supra note 36, at 133.
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possible explanations cannot be ruled out."2 Dean Locke concedes,
however, that the "evidence is indisputable that, compared to general
population distributions, persons of color are disproportionately
represented among those subjected to police use of force where the
discharge of a firearm is involved."245 These findings confirm the an-
ecdotal testimony that has filled the nation's newspapers and radio
and television news programs for the last decade. Blacks from all
walks of society perceive the police as their antagonist. 46
To this list of grievances, blacks can now add pretextual traffic
stops which, according to the Court, raise no Fourth Amendment con-
cerns. Of course, some may doubt the legitimacy of blacks' protest
against pretextual stops. After all, if a black motorist commits a traf-
fic offense, what's wrong with a police stop? And if the police can use
the stop to piggyback a drug investigation, all the better.
This type of thinking is wrong. Police do not target minority
motorists for traffic stops because they are poor drivers. Nor does
police scrutiny occur by chance. Police target blacks and Hispanics
because the officers believe that blacks and Hispanics are involved
244. I at 133.
245. Id at 135. Furthermore, he observes:
The disproportionately high number of complaints filed by citizens of color which allege
police misconduct.., the disproportionately high number of persons of color who are
shot at, injured, or killed by police, the significant number of civil damage suits
involving excessive force claims in which plaintiffs of color receive significant monetary
awards all point to a police-minority community problem of considerable proportions.
Id. at 146.
246. Some of the public is confused by this attitude. After all, blacks, especially poor,
inner-city blacks, are more likely to be the victims of violent crime committed by black criminals
than are whites from the suburbs. See Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial
Discrimination: A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1259 (1994) ('The most lethal danger
facing African-Americans in their day-to-day lives is not white, racist officials of the state, but
private, violent criminals (typically black) who attack those most vulnerable to them without
regard to racial identity."). The irony, then, is that blacks perceive police officers as the enemy.
The explanation for this racial disconnect, however, is clear:
Take a few minutes to sit down with an African-American, preferably a male, and ask
whether he has ever been hassled by the police. Chances are you'll get an
education. ... He may have been pulled over for the offense of driving after dark
through a white neighborhood, for the misdemeanor of driving with a white woman or
for the felony of driving too fancy a car. He may have been questioned for making a
suspicious late-night call from a public phone at a suburban mall or, as a boy, for
flagrantly riding his new bike on his own street. He may have been a student or a
lawyer-even an off-duty policeman, threatened with drawn guns before he could pull
out his badge. Some black parents warn their children never to run out of a store or a
bank- Better to be late than shot dead.
Shipler, supra note 235, at A33. As one scholar noted:
If the police may properly view race as an indicia of suspicion, thereby making people of
color more vulnerable to stops and questioning and all that stems from unwanted
attention from the police, then it follows that people of color will have more reason than
white persons to fear the police, regardless of their compliance with law.
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with narcotics. Large percentages of blacks and Hispanics are
stopped, interrogated, and searched because the police do not respect
their Fourth Amendment rights. Put simply, the police are encour-
aged to do all of this because minority persons, particularly black
men, are deemed second-class citizens in the eyes of law
enforcement.247
V. CONCLUSION
Three hundred years ago colonial officials ordered the
arbitrary seizure of both slave and free blacks for "gadding abroad"
the streets. Before the Constitution recognized blacks as citizens of
the United States, protest against arbitrary intrusions was futile
because blacks "had no rights which the white man was bound to
respect."248 For black motorists, things have not changed signifi-
cantly.249 Police are free to target blacks for traffic seizures and use
those intrusions to initiate unwarranted criminal investigations.
If the Supreme Court is serious about protecting the Fourth
Amendment interests of minority motorists, it should reverse Whren
v. United States forthwith. Realistically, of course, this will not
happen. State judges, however, need not tolerate the status quo on
the nation's highways and roads. Ideally, state judges should rule
that pretextual stops violate the search and seizure provisions of their
state constitutions.2 0
At a minimum, state courts should allow a criminal defendant
the opportunity to show that the facts surrounding his traffic stop
raise an inference of a race-based seizure. This would then require
KENNEDY, supra note 35, at 153.
247. See Jackson, supra note 122, at A25 ("The black American finds that the most
prominent reminder of his second-class citizenship [is] the police.").
248. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,407 (1857).
249. If white motorists were subjected to the same percentages of seizures and searches ex-
perienced by blacks and Hispanics, things would most likely change. See Harris, supra note 19,
at 582 ("African-Americans and Hispanics will suffer the bulk of [pretext stops]. Whites will not
have to endure it very often; if they did, it probably would not happen.").
250. See LAFAVE, supra note 43, § 1.4, at 13 (criticizing the analysis of Whren; "the Court
managed to trivialize what in fact is an exceedingly important [Fourth Amendment] issue
regarding a pervasive law enforcement practice."); cf. Edwin J. Butterfoss, Solving the Pretext
Puzzle: The Importance of Ulterior Motives and Fabrications in the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment Pretext Doctrine, 79 KY. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1990-91) (arguing that the real evil of a pretext
case is the "virtually unlimited authority of police officers to arrest and search based on minor
offenses."); Andrew J. Pulliam, Note, Developing a Meaningful Fourth Amendment Approach to
Automobile Investigatory Stops, 47 VAND. L. REV. 477, 492 (1994) (asserting that constitutional
evil of pretext traffic stops "is that the government can do indirectly through the use of a
combination of Fourth Amendment exceptions what it cannot do directly").
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the prosecution to provide a race-neutral explanation other than the
fact that a traffic offense was observed.
Until this is done, it will be "reasonable," according to the
Supreme Court, for the police to target minority motorists for pretex-
tual stops. Whren assures that black and Hispanic motorists will
continue to be treated as second-class citizens on the nation's
roads-subject to seizure, interrogation, and search at the whim of a
police officer. If Whren is a positive result for some because it adds
another weapon to the police arsenal in the war on drugs,251 it only
confirms what blacks have always known about police power. "With
reason, African-Americans tend to grow up believing that the law is
the enemy, because those who are sworn to uphold the law so often
enforce it in a biased way."252
251. See Frank J. Murray, Court Rules Traffic Stops Netting Drug Arrests Constitutional,
WASHINGTON TIMES, June 11, 1996, at A3 (quoting Bill Johnson, a former police officer and
general counsel for the National Association of Police Organizations, that Whren "formalizes
decisions and practices that are 'good solid police work that's not unconstitutional'"); id.
(quoting Charles Hobson, a lawyer for the Criminal Justice Foundation, applauding Whren
because "[w]e certainly don't want courts to second-guess officers who take action to protect the
public from criminals").
252. Brent Staples, Editorial Notebook: Growing Up to Fear the Law, N.Y. TMS, Mar. 28,
1991, at A24.
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